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In this dissertation, I explore the determinants and implications of the pref-
erences of institutional investors. First, I examine whether institutional in-
vestors’ preference for local investments is related to informational advan-
tage. Analyzing the equity holdings of a large sample of actively managed
mutual funds, I find evidence consistent with the mutual fund industry hav-
ing a perception that local funds have an informational advantage. However,
the portfolio of mutual funds’ local holdings does not display significant su-
perior performance relative to the portfolio of their distant holdings. Using
vi
a parsimonious model, I hypothesize that the profitability of local informa-
tional advantage will be low due to the price impact of trading when there is
a relatively large population of local agents who trade on similar private in-
formation. Consistent with this hypothesis, I find that funds do earn superior
returns on local stocks for which local capital is limited and hence the price
impact of local trades is likely to be small.
Second, I examine the preferences of institutional investors for firm policies
and the relationship between these preferences and firm decisions. I find that
institutional investors exhibit systematic differences in their preferences for
financial and investment policies. Furthermore, these preferences are related
to subsequent changes in the financial and investment policies of the firms
they invest. In particular, a firm is more likely to decrease (increase) its
leverage ratio if its current leverage is higher (lower) than the preferences of its
institutional shareholders. A firm is also more likely to increase (decrease) its
investment if its current investment ratio is lower (higher) than the preferences
of its institutional shareholders. These findings suggest that the preferences
of institutional shareholders are important determinants of corporate policies.
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1. Introduction
As the market share of institutional investors has increased from below 10
percent in 1950 to more than 60 percent in the recent years, they have be-
come the dominant players in the U.S. stock market. Given the continuous
growth of this group of investors both in the U.S. and in the rest of the world,
understanding their role in the determination of asset prices as well as their
influence on corporate behavior and performance has potentially important
implications for investors and policymakers.
The ever-growing institutional ownership may have a significant impact on
the determination of asset prices as the investment decisions of these investors
are likely to have significant effects on asset prices due to the informational
advantage they possess relative to other investors. The shift in corporate
ownership structure due to the increase in institutional ownership can also
have a significant impact on corporate decision-making and governance as their
larger holding sizes and relative independence provide institutional investors
with stronger incentives to deal with managerial moral hazard.
This dissertation includes two essays that contribute to these broad research
questions. In particular, I examine the effects of the preferences of institutional
investors on (1) the investment decisions and performance of these investors
and (2) the role of these investors in corporate decisions.
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First, I explore the role of institutional investors’ preference for local stocks
in their investment decisions and the performance of their portfolios. I find
that mutual fund managers exhibit systematic preference for local stocks; more
precisely, fund managers tend to invest more in local stocks than what is war-
ranted by the market portfolio weights of these stocks. The most natural
explanation for this local bias is that fund managers possess a local informa-
tional advantage due to easier and/or less costly access to private information
about local firms. However, I find that fund managers do not perform better
in local stocks relative to distant stocks.
Second, I explore the role of institutional investors on corporate decisions.
I find that institutional investors reveal systematically diverse preferences for
corporate investment and financing policies. For example, some institutional
investors tend to hold stocks of firms that appear to be underlevered and
others tend to hold stocks that are overlevered. Moreover, I find that the
preferences of the institutional investors that hold a firm’s stock influence the
firm’s financial and investment policies.
1.1. Do Local Investors Know More?
The literature documents evidence of local bias in which investors hold dis-
proportionately more local stocks both in international settings and within
national boundaries.-1 The most natural explanation for this local bias is that
-1French and Poterba (1991), Cooper and Kaplanis (1994), and Tesar and Werner (1995)
provide international evidence of investors’ domestic bias, while Coval and Moskowitz (1999),
2
local investors possess an informational advantage due to easier and/or less
costly access to private information about local firms. However, there is no
apparent consensus in the literature on whether local investors have any in-
formational advantage.0 In the most closely related study to this study, Coval
and Moskowitz (2001) find that fund managers earn substantial superior re-
turns in nearby investments; however, they do not report the corresponding
statistic for distant holdings. Using similar methodology and definitions for
local and distant stocks, I find that this superior mutual fund performance is
not limited to local stock selection: distant mutual fund holdings outperform
other distant stocks by a margin similar to local abnormal performance.1
Both this study and Coval and Moskowitz (2001) use mutual fund holdings
data to calculate fund returns and performance. Since funds only report hold-
ings at quarterly intervals, holdings-based returns do not pick up any abnormal
performance from intra-quarter trading decisions. This is particularly impor-
tant if mutual funds trade aggressively on their private information resulting
Ivković and Weisbenner (2005), and Zhu (2002) provide evidence of U.S. investors’ local bias
in domestic stocks.
0Hau (2001), Dvořák (2005), and Choe, Kho, and Stulz (2005) find that distant investors
are at a disadvantage, while Seasholes (2004), Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000), Froot and
Ramadorai (2005), and Coval and Moskowitz (2001) find that distant investors do better
than local investors and Kang and Stulz (1997) find no difference in the performance of local
and distant investors.
1The literature also documents conflicting evidence on the performance of local and
distant individual U.S. investors. Using a similar methodology to that used by Coval
and Moskowitz (2001), Ivković and Weisbenner (2005) find local investments of individ-
ual investors outperform distant investments significantly in non-S&P 500 stocks but only
marginally in S&P 500 stocks. Using the same data set but a different methodology, Zhu
(2002) finds that investors with greater local bias do not outperform investors with smaller
local bias.
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in most (or all) of their private information being incorporated in prices by
the time the holdings are reported. Instead of focusing on the comparison
between mutual funds’ local and distant performance, this study develops a
parsimonious model of investor trading behavior similar to that in Brennan
and Cao (1997) to produce cross-sectional return prediction for local and dis-
tant holdings as well as additional testable predictions.
In particular, I test the following cross-sectional return prediction of the
model: the average returns of local agents should be negatively correlated
with the relative size of these agents in the population. If there is a larger
group of local agents in the population, these agents will compete more fiercely
to take advantage of their private information. Consequently, the impact of
their trading on market prices will be more severe and the average returns
from their private information will be lower. In the context of this study, this
prediction translates to a hypothesis that the superior performance of local
holdings should be more prominent in stocks with relatively low local fund
population. Consistent with local mutual funds having superior information
and relatively low price impact in these stocks, I find that local mutual fund
positions in these stocks outperform distant fund positions by 2.57% annually.
Adjusting for other stocks with low mutual fund population that were not held
by mutual funds, local mutual fund positions outperform distant positions by
3.01%.
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The model produces other testable implications that have not been thor-
oughly explored in the literature:
• Local investors are more likely to trade earlier and more aggressively.
• Local investors are less likely to chase return trends.
• Distant investors are more likely to initiate positions in stocks that ex-
perienced an increase in local holdings.
The basic ingredients of the models are: (1) local investors have informational
advantage relative to distant investors, and (2) local investors are risk averse
or have diversification objectives. In particular, local investors are assumed to
receive a private signal that is not available to distant investors. When local
investors receive a positive private signal on a particular stock, they will revise
their expectation of the asset’s payoff upwards. The higher expectation will
cause them to buy more of the asset than distant agents who do not receive
any private signal. Since these local agents have diversification objectives, a
subsequent public revelation of their private signal will cause them to try to
lock in some gains by unwinding some of their existing positions. In equilib-
rium, distant agents without private signal will be on the other end of this
trade. Since the revelation of a positive private signal is likely to be asso-
ciated with a price increase, the trades of local investors with private signal
resemble contrarian trades, while the distant agents resemble trend chasers.
Moreover, distant agents’ trades will also seem to mimic local agents because
5
distant agents are buying from local agents who bought the asset in the earlier
trading period.
These implications are tested on the trading decisions of actively managed
U.S. mutual funds in U.S. stocks. By using domestic U.S. data, the analysis
abstracts from any barriers to international investments and the possibility of
varying information gathering capabilities. As each fund enters the analysis
as a local investor in some stocks and a distant investor in others, the findings
in this study are more likely to be caused by the differences in investors’
information about local vs. distant investments instead of the differences in
investors’ ability and availability of resources.
Consistent with the first testable implication from the model, I find that lo-
cal position initiations are associated with larger stock positions than distant
initiations. Moreover, local funds also tend to buy earlier: position initiations
in local stocks are associated with lower pre-initiation institutional ownerships
than position initiations in distant stocks. Consistent with the second predic-
tion, I find that mutual fund managers are less likely to chase return trends
in local stocks. While previous quarter’s return has a significantly positive
effect on the initiation probability of distant stocks2, this effect is significantly
weakened or even reversed for local stocks. Examining whether distant fund
managers perceive that local fund managers have better information, I find
2This finding is consistent with the findings in Brennan and Cao (1997), Froot, O’Connell,
and Seasholes (2001), Griffin, Nardari, and Stulz (2004), and Kaminsky, Lyons, and Schmuk-
ler (2004) that foreign fund flows are positively correlated with lagged returns.
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that distant funds are more likely to initiate new positions in stocks that expe-
rienced an increase in local holdings in the previous period. Although changes
in local holdings are positively correlated with stock returns, the results from
multivariate regressions show that this mimicking behavior is separate from
the trend-chasing behavior. Not only are distant funds chasing return trends,
they are also chasing local funds. This finding suggests that distant funds
perceive local funds to be more likely to receive private information. Overall,
the findings point to a perception in the mutual fund industry that local funds
have an informational advantage.
Taken as a whole, the model and the empirical findings in this study sug-
gest that while local managers perceive themselves and are perceived by other
managers to have some informational advantage, detecting this advantage in
the data is not trivial because fund managers’ aggressiveness in exploiting any
advantage that may exist exacerbates the problem of limited data availability.
1.2. Do Shareholder Preferences Affect Corporate Poli-
cies?
It is well understood that different institutional investors have different in-
vestment styles and tend to hold stocks with different characteristics - e.g.,
value versus growth. In this study, I document that the investment choices of
institutional investors also reveal heterogeneous preferences for financial and
operating characteristics. In particular, some institutional investors tend to
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invest in firms that are underleveraged relative to other firms in their industries
with similar characteristics, while others tend to invest in firms that are over-
leveraged. I also find that the preferences of the institutional investors that
hold a firm’s stock predict the firm’s future financial and investment policies.
Institutional investors can have heterogeneous preferences regarding the in-
vestment and financial policies of the firms they include in their portfolios for
a variety of reasons. Investors can have different opinions on the economic
outlook, which can affect their preferences through several different channels.
For example, investors may have different opinions about a firm’s investment
strategy, preferring a more aggressive investment strategy when they have con-
fidence in management and believe the economy is growing but a less aggres-
sive investment strategy when they have less confidence in both management
and the economic growth prospects. Similarly, investors with a negative opin-
ion on growth prospects may prefer a higher amount of debt to reduce the
availability of free cash flow and the flexibility managers have in investing in
negative NPV projects (Jensen (1986)). Of course, the beneficial effect of debt
in reducing managerial flexibility to take value-destroying projects comes at a
cost as managers saddled with too much debt may underinvest and pass up
positive NPV projects due to debt overhang (Myers (1977), Stulz (1990), and
Hart and Moore (1995)).
My analysis indicates that institutional investors display systematic differ-
ences in their preferences. I measure each institutional investor’s preference
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as the average characteristic of the stocks in its portfolio. The null hypothe-
sis that the preferences for leverage (i.e., the average portfolio debt ratios) of
all institutional investors are the same is strongly rejected both for the raw
debt ratios and when the debt ratios are measured relative to the expected
debt ratios based on industry and firm characteristics. When institutions are
sorted into quintiles based on the average leverage of their holdings, institu-
tions in the top quintile hold stocks that have, on average, 13 percentage points
higher leverage than the stocks held by institutions in the bottom quintile af-
ter controlling for various industry and firm characteristics. I confirm using a
simulation approach that this difference is significantly higher than what one
would observe if institutional investors picked stocks randomly. Moreover, the
heterogeneity persists when institutional investors initiate new positions: the
new stocks initially purchased by institutions currently holding underlever-
aged stocks are more underleveraged relative to the new stocks purchased by
institutions holding overleveraged stocks.
After documenting the heterogeneity in the leverage preferences of insti-
tutional investors, I analyze the extent to which these preferences influence
future corporate decisions. I first infer a particular firm’s institutional pref-
erence by aggregating the preferences of all of its institutional shareholders.
I then examine whether this aggregated preference is related to future policy
decisions of the firm. In particular, I ask whether a firm held by investors
that prefer lower (higher) leverage subsequently makes financial decisions that
decrease (increase) its debt ratio after controlling for various determinants of
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debt ratio. I find that this is indeed the case: about 17 percent of the gap
between the aggregated preference of institutional shareholders and the firm’s
current debt ratio is closed within the first year after controlling for various
firm and industry characteristics. Quantitatively, the estimated effect of insti-
tutional preferences on capital structure choices is as strong as the reversion
to the target leverage proxy previously used in the literature.
I also examine whether this relationship is more pronounced in firms with
certain characteristics. In particular, I focus on firm characteristics that are
related to the likelihood that firm managers accommodate the preferences of
their shareholders. If the relationship between institutional preferences and fu-
ture firm decisions is driven by institutional influence, this relationship should
be less pronounced when firm managers are less likely to accommodate the
preferences of institutional shareholders. Consistent with this hypothesis, the
effect of institutional preferences is less pronounced when the firm is a con-
stituent of S&P 500 (and therefore has a relatively larger potential shareholder
base), larger, older, or managed by these CEOs with weaker career concerns
due to their age or their dual position as the chairman of the board.
Lastly, I examine the potential motivation for firms to incorporate the pref-
erences of institutional shareholders in their policy choices. In particular, I
focus on whether ignoring the preferences of institutional shareholders has any
negative effects on stock prices. I find that firms that change their leverage
ratios in the opposite direction of their shareholders’ preferences experience a
10
higher institutional exit rate and lower stock returns than firms that change
their leverage ratios in the direction of their shareholders’ preferences. Firms
ignoring the preferences of their shareholders underperform those following the
preferences of their shareholders by 6.12% in the year after the capital structure
decisions were made (after controlling for size, B/M, and momentum factors).
This gap in stock performance is not reversed in the subsequent years, which
suggests that the inferior stock performance is reflecting a permanent change
in firm valuation and not due to short-term price pressures.
This study is related to the long line of literature covering investors’ prefer-
ences and clienteles. Researchers in this area have documented the preferences
of institutional investors for stocks with certain characteristics, such as stocks
with high volatility, high-price stocks, liquid stocks, and stocks of large firms
(Falkenstein (1996), Bennett, Sias, and Starks (1998), Gompers and Metrick
(2001), Badrinath, Kale, and Ryan (1996) and Del Guercio (1996)). The cur-
rent study extends this literature in two ways. First, while the literature have
examined the the preference of institutional investors as a monolithic group
(either for the whole universe of institutional investors or for each type of
institutional investors), the analysis in this study focuses on the distinct pref-
erence of each institutional investor. Second, the current study is the first to
examine the heterogeneous preferences of institutional investors for financial
and investment characteristics.3
3The current study is also indirectly related to the literature on dividend clienteles (Grin-
stein and Michaely (2005)). Although the current study does not analyze firm payout deci-
sions, the methodology used in this study can be extended to examine institutional investors’
11
This study also extends the vast literature on the role of institutional in-
vestors as potential monitors of firm managers.4 The methodology used in this
study allows for an examination of the influence of institutional investors using
a considerably broader sample than previous studies that focus on shareholder
proposals or targeting by specific institutions/institution groups.5,6 Further-
more, the aggregated preference of institutional investors provides a bench-
mark to measure the extent of these investors’ influence in firm decisions
through both direct actions (such as shareholder proposals or proxy voting),
indirect actions (the possibility of selling (Parrino, Sias, and Starks (2003))),
and, more importantly, unobservable communications between these investors
and firm management. In addition to the leverage and investment decisions
explored in this study, this benchmark can be applied to other types of firm
decisions to gain useful insights on the general role of institutional investors
heterogenous preferences for dividend and their potentially conflicting effects on firm payout
policy. These heterogeneous preferences can be driven by both agency-related reasons (e.g.,
investors may disagree on the optimal payout policy that minimizes the potential costs of
agency issue) and tax-related reasons (e.g., tax-exempt institutions may be attracted by
firms that pay dividends as hypothesized by Allen, Bernardo, and Welch (2000)).
4This monitoring role can be both direct and indirect. Indirectly, institutional investors
can facilitate monitoring through the market for corporate control by facilitating takeovers
(Brickley, Lease, and Smith (1988), Jarrell and Poulsen (1987), and Agrawal and Mandelker
(1992)). Institutional investors holding large stakes can also act as direct monitors by
influencing the actions of firm managers (Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and Admati, Pfleiderer,
and Zechner (1994)).
5A partial list of studies focusing on shareholder proposals includes Karpoff, Malatesta,
and Walkling (1996), Daily, Johnson, Ellstrand, and Dalton (1996), Bizjak and Marquette
(1998), Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999), Gillan and Starks (2000), Prevost and Rao (2000),
and Matvos and Ostrovsky (2006).
6Gillan and Starks (2007) provide a recent survey of the strand of literature that focuses
on specific institutional investor groups. The studies in this literature include Nesbitt (1994),
Wahal, Wiles, and Zenner (1995), Smith (1996), Strickland, Wiles, and Zenner (1996),
Wahal (1996), and Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach (1998).
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in corporate policy decisions.
This study is closely related to several recent studies. Focusing on firm
acquisition decisions, Harford, Jenter, and Li (2007) document that cross-
holdings by a firm’s shareholders affect its choice of takeover targets. In the
most closely related study to this study, Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2007)
document the heterogeneity of blockholders in terms of the financial, invest-
ment, and executive compensation policies of the stocks they hold. Although
the current study also documents the heterogeneity of investors’ holdings in
financial and investment policies, it differs from Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach
(2007) in several important ways. First, this study focuses on the relationship
between investors’ preferences and future changes in firm policies. Second,
the wide availability of institutional holdings data (all publicly traded U.S.
stocks since 1980) allows this study to examine a considerably broader sample
of firms for a longer period of time than Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2007)’s
blockholder sample for the 1996-2001 period. Third, the approach used in this
study allows for an examination of (1) the dynamics of the relationship be-
tween institutional investors and firm managers, and (2) whether the influence
of institutional investors has a positive effect on firm valuation.
In summary, I find that institutional investors play a significant role in
firms’ financial and investment policies. For example, a firm is more likely to
increase leverage through share repurchases if its current leverage is lower than
the aggregate preference of its institutional shareholders. Moreover, firms that
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change leverage ratios in the opposite direction of the aggregate preferences
of their shareholders experience lower stock returns than those that follow the
aggregate leverage preferences of their institutional investors. In addition to
the reported empirical results, this study also offers a novel empirical approach
to infer the heterogenous preferences of institutional investors. Applying this
approach to other types of firm decisions (financial or otherwise) can provide
more insights on the role of institutional investors in corporate policy decisions.
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2. Do Local Investors Know More? Evidence
from Mutual Fund Location and Investments
This chapter develops a model and provides empirical findings on the role
of institutional investors’ preference for local stocks in their investment de-
cisions and the performance of their portfolios. The chapter is structured as
follows. In the first subsection, I present the model. Subsection 2 describes the
data used in this study. Subsection 3 exhibits and discusses evidence on the
variation in mutual funds’ holdings and trading behaviors as a function of geo-
graphical proximity to investments. This subsection also investigates the rela-
tionship between local funds’ holdings and distant funds’ investment decisions.
Subsection 4 provides evidence on the relationship between geographical prox-
imity and mutual funds’ performance as well as the cross-sectional variations
of geographically-related performance differential. Subsection 5 concludes.
2.1. Model
2.1.1. Setup
The model is a two-period general equilibrium model that follows the noisy
rational expectations model of Hellwig (1980). The basic premise of the model
is similar to that of Brennan and Cao (1997): local investors have an infor-
mational advantage relative to distant investors. The economy is assumed to
have a single asset whose payoff, x̃, is realized at time t=2 and is normally
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distributed with mean x̄ and precision φx. There are three types of traders
in the market: liquidity/noise (N), informed local (L) and uninformed distant
(D) traders. Noise traders are characterized by their aggregate demand, d̃Nt ,
which is normally and independently distributed with mean 0 and precision
φNt . Informed local traders and uninformed distant traders are characterized
by exponential utility functions defined over time t=2 consumption with com-
mon risk tolerance τ . The mass of distant traders in the economy is normalized
as 1 and the mass of local traders is α. All traders can trade in two trading
sessions which are held at times t=0 and t=1. The prices, P̃t, are set as a
function of traders’ demands.
Unlike distant traders, local traders receive a private signal about the asset’s
payoff x̃ prior to the first trading session at t=0:
s̃L0 = x̃ + ε̃
L
0 , (1)
where ε̃L0 is normally and independently distributed with mean 0 and precision
φL0 . Since all agents are not endowed with any asset, each agent’s holding
after t=0 trading (h̃i0) equals to her demand (d̃
i
0), which is a function of her
information set:
FL0 = {x̄, s̃L0 , P̃0}
FD0 = {x̄, P̃0}
16
Immediately prior to the second trading session at t=1, the private signal is
revealed to the distant traders. After the second trading session, each agent’s
holding (h̃i1) equals to her holding after the first trading session plus her de-




1 = {x̄, s̃L0 , P̃0, P̃1}
I will first solve for the market equilibria at t=0 and at t=1, respectively,
and then calculate the expected trading profit of local and distant agents. The
timeline of these events are presented below.
2.1.2. Market Equilibrium (t=0)
Right before the trading session at t=1, agent i holds h̃i0 of the asset as a
result of the trading at t=0. In order to maximize her expected utility at t=2,
she adjusts her holding to take into account the new information (in the case









− d̃i0, i ∈ {L,D}, (3)
where each agent’s information set is as follow:
FL1 = F
D
1 = {x̄, s̃L0 , P̃0, P̃1}
Taking her potential demand at t=1 into account, each agent’s demand at












= τ{φx(x̄− P̃0)} (5)






0 = 0, (6)
7This demand function may seem surprising given that agents should maximize their
expected utility at t=1 instead of t=2. The proof is provided in Section 2.6.
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Similar to price functions in other noisy rational expectation equilibrium
models, the equilibrium price is a weighted average of the unconditional ex-
pectation of the payoff (φx), private signal, and the demand of liquidity traders.
Moreover, the sensitivity of price to the private signal of local agents is pos-
itively correlated to α, the relative population size of these agents. In other
words, as the relative size of local agents in the population increases, these
agents compete more fiercely to take advantage of their private signal. This
overzealous trading pushes the price closer to the signal. Consequently, the
private information of local agents is more quickly incorporated into prices,
which reduces their trading profit. I will discuss the sensitivity of trading
profit to the population size of local agents in more details in Section 2.4.
Plugging the price function back to the local and distant agents’ demand
functions and examining the difference between those demand functions give
rise to the following proposition.
Proposition 1. The equilibrium demand of local agents is higher than the
equilibrium demand of distant agents if the following condition is satisfied:




Since the demand from noise traders (d̃N0 ) is zero on average, local
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agents have higher expected demand than distant agents when their private
signal is relatively higher than the unconditional prior. The proof is provided
in Section 2.6. The intuition behind this proposition is that local agents with a
positive private signal have a higher valuation of the asset’s payoff than distant
agents with no private signal. Consequently, local agents are more likely to
buy the asset at t=0 after receiving a relatively positive private signal.
2.1.3. Market Equilibrium (t=1)






1 = 0. (8)
and is given by the following equilibrium price function:
P̃1 =









Plugging P̃1 back to the demand function and simplifying some terms lead
to the following proposition.
Proposition 2. The equilibrium demands of local and distant agents in the
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trading session at t=1 are given by
d̃L1 = −κ(P̃1 − P̃0)
d̃D1 = ακ(P̃1 − P̃0)− d̃N1
respectively, where κ = τ(φL0 +φ
X) > 0. Therefore, the demand of local agents
is less likely to be positively correlated with the price change (P̃1 − P̃0).
The proof is provided in Section 2.6.
In order to describe the dynamics of the model more clearly, consider an
example in which local agents receive a positive private signal. After observing
the positive private signal, local agents revise their expectation of the asset
payoff upwards such that it is higher than that of distant agents. Consequently,
local agents have higher demands for the asset at any price than do distant
agents. Since the noise traders have zero demand on average, the price is set
such that local agents buy some of the asset from distant agents at t=0.
Since the private signal is revealed to distant agents at t=1, the price at t=1
will move in the same direction as the private signal. The signal revelation
will have an expectation effect: distant traders are more likely to revise their
expectations upwards and hence increase their holdings. The price increase
will have a risk-sharing effect on the local agents who are holding more of
the assets. Since their private information is revealed to distant agents and
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incorporated into the price at t=1, these risk-averse agents will try to share
the risk and reduce the volatility of their portfolio by selling some of their
existing positions. The combination of these two effects and the assumption
of zero average demand of the liquidity traders result in local agents selling to
distant agents after a price increase. Consequently, an empiricist will observe
local agents behaving as contrarians (selling after a price increase) and distant
agents as trend-chasers (buying after a price increase).
2.1.4. Trading Profits and Price Impact
When local agents receive a positive private signal, they demand a positive
amount of the asset. As the relative size of local agents increases in the popu-
lation of informed agents, they will compete more fiercely to take advantage of
their shared private signal. Since all traders are price-takers, the more intense
local competition results in a higher aggregate demand of local traders. Since
the market-clearing price is an increasing function of the aggregate demand,
the higher local traders’ demand will result in a higher trading price on aver-
age. In other words, a higher relative size of local agents in the population will
result in a higher purchase price and a lower realized trading profit for these
agents.
Proposition 3. Given a relatively positive private signal, the price impact of
local agents is positively correlated with the relative size of these agents in the
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population:






Since the average noise traders’ demand (d̃N0 ) is zero, the condition is
usually satisfied when the private signal (s̃L0 ) is significantly higher than the
prior (x̄).8 The proof of this proposition is provided in the Section 2.6.
Proposition 4. The average trading profit of local agents is negatively corre-
lated with the relative size of these agents in the population.
While a closed-form solution for each agent’s expected trading profit is not
attainable, numerical simulations are used to calculate the expected trading
profit for various levels of parameter values. In particular, this study is in-
terested in the abnormal returns of local agents relative to those of distant
agents as a function of α, the relative size of local agents in the population.
For simplicity of exposition I vary local agents’ informational advantage (φL0 )
and their relative size in the population (α) while fixing the other parameters.
Figure 2.1 (2.2) reports the average abnormal trading profits (returns) of
local agents relative to those of distant agents as a function of local agents’
8This condition is identical to the one in Proposition 1. In other words, the price impact
of local agents is increasing in the relative size of these agents when the demand of local
agents is higher than the demand of distant agents.
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informational advantage and their relative size in the population. The trading
returns are calculated as the trading profits divided by the sum of the absolute
value of each agent’s position after each trading session. The horizontal axes
represent the parameters of interest: the relative size of local agents in the
population and the difference in information quality. The other parameters
are fixed at the following values: x̄ = 0, φx = 10, φN0 = φ
N
1 = 15, φ1 = 10,
and τ (risk tolerance) = 10. It is important to note that local agents are
assumed to have superior information relative to distant agents throughout
both figures.
Figure 1 shows that the average trading profits of local agents is decreasing
with their relative size in the population. This relationship obtains for each
level of informational advantage. Although the average trading profits of local
agents are higher than those of distant agents throughout the whole graph,
local agents have significantly higher average profits than distant agents only
in situations in which local agents make up a relatively small part of the
population (i.e., the lighter-shaded area in the left-hand portion of the graph).
Similarly, Figure 2 shows that the average trading returns of local agents is
decreasing with their relative size in the population. The average returns of
local agents are only marginally higher than distant agents (i.e., the darker-
shaded area in the right-hand portion of the graph) once local agents make up
a relatively large part of the population.
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2.1.5. Testable Implications
In the context of this study, mutual funds are conjectured to perceive their
information quality about local stocks to be higher than about distant stocks.
To test this conjecture, I focus on the trading behavior of growth and aggressive-
growth mutual funds, and, in particular, their stock position initiations. Rel-
ative to other types of mutual funds, growth and aggressive-growth mutual
funds are more likely to have active portfolio managers that rely on stock-
picking ability. Moreover, their initiation decisions are more likely to be re-
lated to information than changes to ongoing positions which may be related
to diversification, profit realization, and/or fund flows.9
The first two hypotheses are related to mutual funds’ perception of their
informational advantage in local vs. distant stocks. The first hypothesis is an
adaptation of Proposition 1 for stock initiations.
H. 1. (Position Size) Position initiations in local stocks are associated with:
• earlier initiations (proxied by lower pre-initiation institutional owner-
ship), and
• larger stock positions
9Badrinath and Wahal (2002) find that institutions act as momentum traders when they
initiate (enter) stocks but as contrarian traders when they terminate (exit) stocks or make
adjustments to ongoing holdings. They also find that the tendency to buy winners is rela-
tively stronger for position initiations relative to changes to ongoing holdings. On the other
hand, Johnson (2007) finds evidence suggesting that individual mutual fund shareholders
behave as momentum traders in their initiations, terminations, and changes to ongoing
holdings.
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than position initiations in distant stocks.
Since private signals are not directly observable, I use pre-initiation
institutional ownership to proxy for the likelihood that a particular initiation
is driven by private signal. If the pre-initiation institutional ownership is
relatively low, the initiation is more likely to be driven by private signal. On
the other hand, an initiation with relatively high pre-initiation institutional
ownership is more likely to be associated with publicly available signals.
Adapting proposition 2 gives rise to the following hypothesis.
H. 2. (Trend-Chasing) Mutual funds are more likely to be trend-chasers in
distant stock initiations than in local stock initiations.
In addition to testing the trend-chasing hypothesis which is related to each
mutual fund’s perception of its own information quality, I also examine whether
distant funds perceive local funds to have higher information quality. If this is
the case, distant funds will behave as if they are chasing local funds’ holdings.
H. 3. (Mimicking) The probability of distant stock initiations is positively
correlated with last period’s local fund demand.
While mutual funds may perceive their information quality about local
stocks to be higher than about distant stocks, it is still an empirical question
whether their local investments perform better than their distant investments.
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Since the model does not give a directional prediction, I focus on the follow-
ing cross-sectional return prediction of the model instead: the profitability of
private signal received by local agents is negatively correlated with the rela-
tive population size of these local agents. As the population of local investors
increases, more local investors will try to take advantage of the local informa-
tional advantage. This increased competition will increase the price impact of
their trading since their aggregate demand will divulge more information and
push the market price closer to their private signal. The higher purchase price
will reduce the profitability of local information when the population size of
local agents are relatively high.
H. 4. (Cross-Sectional Return Difference) The difference in average
returns of local and distant investments will be higher in stocks with relatively
low local mutual fund population.
2.2. Data
In this study, I combine five databases: the Thomson Financial mutual fund
holdings database (formerly known as the CDA Spectrum holdings database),
the monthly CRSP stock database, Compact Disclosure database, Nelson’s
1988, 1994 and 2000 Directories of Investment Managers, and US Census Bu-
reau’s 1999 Zip Code database. To ensure that the funds in the sample are
actively managed equity funds, the sample is limited to funds whose objectives
are identified by Thomson Financial as growth (IOC=2) or aggressive growth
(IOC=3).
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Compact Disclosure and Nelson’s Directory provide the information on firms’
and mutual funds’ headquarter zip codes. Using the Zip Code file, these zip
codes are translated into latitude and longitude coordinates, which are then
used to calculate the distance between firm and mutual fund headquarters.
Each stock located within 100 km of a particular fund is categorized as local
stocks for that fund; stocks located outside the 100 km radius are categorized
as distant.10 Although the economic location of a firm may be more accurately
captured by the location of its operations, the firm’s headquarter location rep-
resents the location where most of its managerial decisions are made. On
the other hand, a mutual fund’s headquarter location may not be where its
fund managers are located. This is particularly problematic for large funds
with sub-advisors located in various parts of the country. This problem can
be alleviated using NSAR forms in which mutual funds report the name and
location of each of its subadvisors. Since NSAR forms are only available in
the later half of the sample, the reported results in this study are calculated
using only fund headquarter location. However, the results for the later half of
the sample are very similar if the location of fund sub-advisors obtained from
NSAR forms are used instead.
As the fund location data is hand-collected from Nelson’s 1988, 1994 and
2000 Directories, my sample period is limited to 1985–2004.11 Snapshots of the
10The threshold distance of 100 km is chosen to match the one used in Coval and
Moskowitz (1999) and Coval and Moskowitz (2001). The results reported in this study
are robust to changing the threshold to 50 km or 200 km. The data sets used in this study
are also used in those papers.
11The results are quantitatively similar if the data from 1988–2000 is used instead.
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geographical distribution of mutual funds and firms in my sample is displayed
in Figures 2.3 and 2.4, respectively. Contrary to the geographically dispersed
distribution of firm headquarters, mutual funds seem to be highly concentrated
in major metropolitan areas, particularly the I-95 corridor between Boston and
Philadelphia, Chicago, San Francisco Bay area, and Los Angeles. The mutual
fund industry seems to become more geographically diverse over time as many
new funds locate outside the major metropolitan areas. However, this may
reflect the growth of the mutual fund industry as a whole since the proportion
of funds located in the major metropolitan areas actually increase slightly over
time: the increase in the number of funds in the remote areas is offset by an
even larger increase in the already crowded areas.
2.3. Location and Investment Decisions
2.3.1. Local Bias
I first examine the prevalence of local bias in my sample. Consistent with
the findings in Coval and Moskowitz (1999), I find that funds tend to invest
more heavily in local stocks than in distant stocks. More precisely, mutual
funds hold a higher portfolio weight of local stocks than the portfolio weight
suggested by the combined market capitalization of their local stocks. This
result is obtained by employing a methodology similar to the one used in Coval
and Moskowitz (2001). For fund f , the local bias variable, LBf , is calculated
as the difference between the cumulative portfolio weight of local holdings
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(based on dollar invested) and the cumulative market portfolio weight of local








where Lf is the set of all local stocks available to fund f , wfs,t is fund f ’s
portfolio weight of stock s at the end of quarter t, wMs,t is stock s’s market
portfolio weight at the end of quarter t. Cross-regional variations in local bias











where FR is the set of all funds in metropolitan region R, LBft is fund f ’s
local bias, and Aft is fund f ’s asset under management. The local bias of the
entire mutual fund industry is calculated as the asset-weighted average across










As reported in Table 2.1, an average fund displays a local bias as the aver-
age local portfolio weight is 0.54% higher than the average market portfolio
weight. Although funds in most major metropolitan areas display a local bias,
there are significant variations in the degree and the existence of local bias
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among different metropolitan areas. In six out of the top eleven metropolitan
areas (San Francisco, Los Angeles, Seattle, Boston, Washington and Hous-
ton), mutual funds display a significant local bias. Funds in four other major
metropolitan areas (Dallas, Chicago, Philadelphia, and Atlanta) show no or
weak local bias. On the other hand, New York funds show a high degree of
distant bias as their average local portfolio weight is 4.11% lower than what
is warranted by the market capitalizations of local New York stocks. This is
in stark contrast to funds in the San Francisco Bay area whose average local
portfolio weight is 5.65% higher than what is warranted by the market capi-
talizations of their local stocks. The degree of local bias in other metropolitan
areas and rural areas (1.77%; the last row in Panel C) is also slightly higher
than the average for all mutual funds.
2.3.2. Position Initiation
In this subsubsection, I first examine whether local funds tend to initiate
stock positions earlier than distant funds. If local fund managers perceive their
private information to be more precise, they should initiate stock positions
earlier than distant fund managers. Since mutual funds tend to move in and
out of stocks repeatedly, comparing the average time variables (year or quarter)
of local and distant initiations does not provide a clear test of whether local
funds initiate stock positions earlier than distant funds. Instead, I examine the
average pre-initiation institutional ownership for local and distant initiations.
If mutual funds perceive their private local information to be more precise than
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their distant information, local initiations should be preceded by relatively
lower shares of institutional ownerships when compared to distant initiations.
In order to compare the institutional ownership variable across stocks, each
stock’s quarterly institutional ownership is normalized by the average of its
institutional ownership over the previous year. Consistent with local fund
managers perceiving their private information to be more precise, the first
line in Panel A of Table 2 reveals that the average pre-initiation normalized
institutional ownership of local stocks is 1.48% lower than that of distant
stocks.
Continuing in the same vein, I test Hypothesis 1 which states that position
initiations in local stocks are associated with larger stock positions than posi-
tion initiations in distant stocks. I define the initiation size of mutual fund i in
stock j, ∆i,j, as the dollar value of fund i ’s initial investment in stock j divided
by the dollar value of fund i ’s aggregate stock holdings. Panel B of Table 2
reports the geographical variation in stock initiation size. As reported in the
first row, local initiation size are, on average, 0.13% larger than distant initia-
tion size. Since the median fund size in my sample is around $85M, this 0.13%
difference translates to a $111,285 difference in initiation size. This difference
is slightly reduced after controlling for the following stock and fund charac-
teristics: the stock’s market value at the beginning of the initiation quarter,
the initiation quarter stock return, the initiation quarter stock turnover, and
the size of the fund at the beginning of the initiation quarter. Controlling
for fund and quarter fixed effects reduces the difference even more to 0.03%
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which is still statistically significant. Although this approach is conservative
since it only includes funds that initiate both local and distant stocks in the
same quarter, the point estimate of 0.03% is around 3% of the typical initia-
tion size12 and translates to an average difference in initiation size of $22,327
between local and distant initiations. Taken together, the results in this sub-
subsection are consistent with mutual funds perceiving their local information
to be more precise than their distant information.
2.3.3. Trend-Chasing
Several papers have examined the trend-chasing tendency of institutional in-
vestors and its cross-sectional variations across investors with different charac-
teristics. Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1995) document that mutual funds
systematically buy stocks that were past winners, but do not systematically
sell past losers. Their evidence also indicates that growth and aggressive-
growth funds have the highest tendency to engage in momentum investing,
with around 57% of these funds systematically buy past winners. Using a
larger and more recent sample, Wermers (1999) finds that mutual funds (in
particular, aggressive growth and growth funds) tend to buy past “winners”
as a herd.
Badrinath and Wahal (2002) confirm these findings for other types of in-
stitutional investors.13 They find that institutions act as momentum traders
12The average initiation size is around 1% of the aggregate dollar value of stock holdings.
13Their sample includes pension funds, mutual funds, investment advisors, insurance com-
panies, commercial banks and trusts, investment banks and brokers, and colleges and foun-
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when they initiate (enter) stocks but as contrarian traders when they termi-
nate (exit) stocks or make adjustments to ongoing holdings. They also find
that the tendency to buy winners is relatively stronger for position initiations
relative to changes to ongoing holdings. Moreover, they find that institutions
with growth objectives are momentum traders, but that institutions with value
objectives are contrarian traders. The equity growth funds in their sample de-
viate from the null of random selection by 10%, while the equity value funds
deviate by negative 8%. Griffin, Harris, and Topaloglu (2003) provide evidence
of institutional trend chasing using daily data. They show that institutions
are more than 20% more likely to buy stocks in the top decile of prior day’s
stock return than those in the bottom decile.
This study differs from the above studies in that its primary focus is how
information is related to trend-chasing tendencies. In particular, I assume that
local funds perceive their information quality to be higher and test whether
this perception causes the observed trend-chasing tendencies to be different
between local and distant initiations. In an informal test, I calculate the
proportion of stocks initiated by mutual funds that had earned higher than
median returns in the previous quarter. If past returns do not systematically
enter into mutual funds’ stock initiation decisions, they should be equally likely
to initiate stocks with returns above or below the median. A positive devia-
tion suggests a trend-chasing tendency, while a negative deviation suggests a
contrarian behavior. I find that the actively-managed equity growth funds in
dations.
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my sample exhibit trend-chasing behavior in their stock initiations as 59.49%
of the stocks they initiate have returns higher than the median return in the
previous quarter.14
Local funds’ perceived information advantage may reduce the likelihood of
trend-chasing even more. Indeed, the last line of Panel A in Table 2 reveals
that 58.69% of initiated local stocks have returns higher than the median
return in the previous quarter. This figure is 1.19% lower than the percentage
of initiated distant stocks with returns higher than the median. Although this
difference may seem trivial, it represents 12% of the deviation of mutual funds’
initiation decisions from the null hypothesis of random selection.15 This seems
to suggest that although equity growth funds as a whole tend to chase return
trends in their stock initiations, this trend-chasing tendency is weaker in local
stocks.
To allow for more appropriate control groups and more complete specifica-
tions of control variables, I test Hypothesis 2 (Trend-Chasing) using probit
regressions of the likelihood of stock initiation as a function of past stock re-
turn and other control variables. The dependent variable is 1 if a fund initiates
a position in quarter t and 0 otherwise. To reduce the number of stocks under
consideration, the candidates for initiations are restricted to stocks that are in-
14This result is qualitatively consistent with prior evidence in the literature. Using differ-
ent methodologies, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1995) document 7% deviation in their
sample of growth and aggressive-growth funds, and Badrinath and Wahal (2002) find that
equity growth funds in their sample deviate from the null of random selection by 10%.
15The difference is slightly larger (1.30%) in the second half of my sample (1995-2004).
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cluded in the Russell 3000 index but are not currently held by each fund during
each period. Since the membership lists of Russell indices are only available
starting in the mid 1990s, I generate two copycat Russell lists that consist of
the 1000 largest stocks (Russell 1000) and the next 2000 stocks (Russell 2000),
respectively, for each year in which the lists are not available.
The main independent variable of interest is the excess stock return in quar-
ter t–1 after adjusting for CRSP value-weighted index. To isolate the preva-
lence of trend-chasing within each geographical proximity category, I use a
“local” dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for “local” stocks whose head-
quarters are located within 100 km, and 0 for “distant” stocks whose head-
quarters are located further than 100 km from the mutual fund headquarter.
Both the dummy variable and its interaction with the excess stock return in
t–1 are included in the regressions. The other control variables are fund size
at the beginning of quarter t–1, market value of the stock at the beginning
of quarter t–1, fund returns for the last 12 months (up to the end of quarter
t–1), and fund flow in quarter t–1. In the spirit of Fama-MacBeth (1973), I
divide the sample into annual subsamples and run annual probit regressions
since the number of fund-stock observations becomes excessively large in a
pooled specification. The marginal effects of annual regressions are then used
to obtain the time-series averages and standard errors. The regressions are
run separately for Russell 1000 stocks and Russell 2000 stocks to control for
potential non-linear size effects.
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As reported in Table 3, the stocks in Russell 1000 are more than twice
as likely to be initiated as Russell 2000 stocks. Consistent with the local
bias evidence, stocks are also more than twice more likely to be initiated by
local funds than by distant funds. More importantly for the purpose of this
study, the trend-chasing results for Russell 1000 stocks in column (1) are quite
striking: although trend-chasing is prevalent for both local and distant Russell
1000 stocks, the trend-chasing behavior in local stocks is 84 percent weaker
than in distant stocks. While a one standard deviation increase in the previous
quarter return of a Russell 1000 stock increases its likelihood of initiation by
distant funds by 36.67% from its unconditional mean, its likelihood of initiation
by local funds is only increased by 2.85%.
Even more strikingly, the results for Russell 2000 stocks in column (2) show
that although trend-chasing is still prevalent in smaller distant stocks, the
effect is completely canceled out in smaller local stocks: the attenuation of
local trend-chasing tendencies in these stocks is such that the effect of stock
returns on initiation probability is negative and not statistically significant. A
one standard deviation increase in previous quarter return increases the like-
lihood of distant (local) Russell 2000 stock initiation by 70.65% (−19.62%)
from its unconditional mean. The weaker (or non-existent) trend-chasing ten-
dency in local stock initiations suggests that mutual funds perceive their local
information quality to be higher.
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An ardent reader may notice that while the findings so far are consistent
with mutual funds having more confidence in their information about local
stocks than distant stocks, some of the findings are also consistent with lo-
cal familiarity bias (Merton (1987) and Kang and Stulz (1997)). If mutual
fund managers only invest in stocks that are familiar to them and they are
more likely to be familiar with local stocks, it is not surprising to see that
mutual fund managers hold more local stocks and therefore have a local bias.
Moreover, familiarity bias may also drive the trend-chasing results if distant
investors’ familiarity with a particular stock is more highly correlated with the
stock’s past return than local investors’ familiarity. In other words, while a
particular stock’s high return does not affect the initiation decisions of local
investors who are already familiar with the stock, the high return may com-
pel distant investors to familiarize themselves with the stock and potentially
initiate a position.
However, the familiarity bias is not consistent with larger local initiation
size. Since mutual funds will only initiate (local and distant) stocks they are
familiar with, the familiarity bias does not predict larger initiation size for local
stocks. Moreover, I also find that the attenuation of trend-chasing behavior
in local stocks also exists in the subsample of stocks that were recently held
by each mutual fund. Since these stocks are already familiar to the fund
managers, any relationship between past returns and initiation decisions in
this subsample should not be driven by geographical variations in familiarity.
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2.3.4. Mimicking
Distant funds may chase local funds’ holdings if distant funds perceive local
funds as having higher information quality in local investments. In order to
examine the prevalence of mimicking behavior of this type and formally test
Hypothesis 3, I investigate the initiation probabilities of stocks grouped by the
excess stock returns and changes in local (distant) fund ownership in the pre-
vious quarter. Local (distant) mutual fund ownership in a particular stock is
defined as the aggregate percentage ownership of local (distant) funds in that
stock. Panel A of Table 4 presents the initiation probability of distant stocks
as a function of past returns (measured as the previous quarter excess stock
returns) and changes in local fund ownership. Although stock return is posi-
tively correlated with contemporaneous change in fund ownership, the number
of stocks in each subsample is similar suggesting that the correlation is not
strong enough to affect the inference. The result suggests that distant funds
are more likely to initiate a new position after an increase in local ownership
regardless of whether the stock’s previous quarter’s excess return is negative
or positive. Therefore, the mimicking behavior of distant funds is likely to be
distinct from trend-chasing.16
In order to check whether there is an inverse effect in which the changes
in distant fund ownerships affect the initiation decisions of local funds, I sort
16Although funds are only required to report their holdings once every six months, many
funds file a report every quarter. Moreover, many funds report their holdings within 45
days of the end of the quarter, giving distant funds at least 45 days to analyze and mimic
local funds’ previous quarter’s trades.
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stocks into two groups based on the ownership position change of distant
funds and measure the average local initiation probability of stocks within
each group. Panel B of Table 4 presents the initiation probability of local
stocks as a function of past return and changes in distant fund ownership.
The result suggests that local funds are more likely to initiate a new position
after an increase in a particular stock’s distant fund ownership only when
the stock’s excess return is positive in the previous quarter. Consequently,
any observed mimicking behavior from local funds is likely to be related to
trend-chasing.
To control for trend-chasing behavior as well as other potential motivations
for initiation, I employ a similar framework as the one used in the previous
section. Panel C of Table 4 presents the results from Fama-MacBeth style
multivariate probit regressions of initiation probability on both distant and
local ownership changes as well as past returns and other control variables.
Consistent with the bivariate results, the multivariate results reveal that the
mimicking behavior of distant funds is separate from trend-chasing. After
controlling for return effects, a one standard deviation increase in the local
mutual fund demand of a particular stock in the previous quarter increases its
initiation likelihood by distant funds by 2.06% from its unconditional mean.
Similarly, local initiations are also affected by previous changes in local own-
ership. In other words, local mutual funds display some herding behavior.
On the other hand, distant ownership changes do not significantly affect the
initiation decisions of local and distant funds. Overall, the results in Table 4
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are consistent with a perception in the mutual fund industry that local funds
have an informational advantage.
2.4. Location and Performance
2.4.1. Local and Distant Returns
In this subsubsection, the focus of analysis is on whether local investments
of mutual funds have abnormally superior performance. Following Coval and
Moskowitz (2001), fund’s holdings at the end of quarter t–1 are split into two
portfolios: local and distant. Since this study is interested in the stock-picking
ability of these agents, a benchmark-adjusted return is calculated for each stock
quarterly following the methodology suggested by Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman,
and Wermers (1997):
r̂s,t = rs,t − rps,t,
where rs,t is the raw return of stock s in quarter t, and rps,t is the return of a
benchmark portfolio which contains stocks with similar size, book-to-market
and momentum. The benchmark portfolios are constructed by running a triple
dependent sort on size (market value of equity), book-to-market ratio, and
momentum. First, firms in the sample are sorted into five size quintiles using
NYSE breakpoints. Firms within each of the five size quintiles are then sorted
into five B/M quintiles. Finally, firms within each of the 25 size-B/M portfolios
are sorted into five momentum quintiles. The portolio that contains stock s is
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designated as its benchmark portfolio, ps.
17
I then calculate the average benchmark-adjusted return of local and distant
portfolios for each fund in quarter t, weighting each stock by the value of the


















where Lf is the set of local stocks available to fund f , wfs,t−1 is fund f ’s portfolio
weight of stock s at the end of quarter t−1, and r̂s,t is DGTW-adjusted return
of stock s in quarter t. To arrive at the figures reported in the first row of
each panel in Table 5, I take the average returns of local and distant portfolios
across funds for quarter t weighted by the size of each fund’s equity holdings,
annualized the returns, and then calculate the time-series average of these
annualized returns.
Coval and Moskowitz (2001) reports that local investments earn 1.18% more
(in annualized returns) than distant holdings after adjusting for size, market-
to-book and momentum. Although the return relationship is quite strong in
the first half of their sample (2.32%; 1975–1984), it is almost nonexistant in
17In order to avoid benchmark return miscalculations, I compare my portfolios with the
portfolio assignments available on Russ Wermers’ website ( http://www.smith.umd.edu/
faculty/rwermers/ftpsite/Dgtw/coverpage.htm) which uses a slightly modified version
of Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997) as described in Wermers (2003). I find
that my portfolio assignment is very similar to Wermers’ assignment; the results presented
in this section are almost identical using either assignment.
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the second half (1985–1994). Replicating the latter finding using a different
dataset, I find that the difference in performance is virtually zero (0.09% annu-
alized) during the second half of their sample period as reported in the first line
in Panel B of Table 5. In the following decade (1995–2004), local investments
outperform distant investments by an almost identical amount (0.08%; Panel
C of Table 5), which is neither statistically nor economically significant. The
first line in Panel A of Table 5 shows that local holdings outperform distant
holdings by only 0.09% during the entire sample period from 1985 to 2004.18
2.4.2. Local and Distant Performance
A cleaner test for the quality of information may be through fund selectivity:
do stocks mutual funds hold perform better than those they do not hold? In
this study, funds’ selectivity is measured by the difference between the returns
of the stocks in their holdings and those not in their holdings. This difference


















18The numbers in the first line of each panel in Table 5 correspond to the Characteristic
Selectivity (CS) measure in Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997). CS measure is
defined as: CSi,t =
∑N
j=1 w̃i,j,t−1(R̃j,t − R̃bj,t−1t ), where w̃i,j,t−1 is fund i’s portfolio weight
on stock j at the end of quarter (t− 1), Rj,t is the quarter t return of stock j, and R̃bj,t−1t
is the quarter t return of the characteristic-based passive portfolio that is matched to stock
j at the end of quarter t–1. Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997) report that
the CS measure of growth (aggressive growth) funds is 1.03% (1.49%) in the 1975 to 1994
period. Following the same methodology, Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005) report that
the CS measure of actively managed mutual funds is 0.96% in the 1984 to 1999 period.
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where Sft−1 is the set of stocks held by fund f at the end of quarter t−1, wfs,t−1 is
fund f ’s portfolio weight of stock s at the end of quarter t−1, wMs,t−1 is stock s’s
market portfolio weight at the end of quarter t−1, and r̂s,t is DGTW-adjusted
return of stock s in quarter t. The last line in Panel A of Table 5 reports the
difference between the annualized (characteristics-adjusted) returns of stocks
held and not held by mutual funds. Column (1) on this line reveals that growth
and aggressive-growth mutual funds as a group perform superbly even after
characteristics adjustments as the stocks they hold outperform those they do
not hold by 1.29% annually.
Given this superior performance of mutual funds in this sample, the more
relevant question is whether this is due to superior local performance or su-
perior distant performance. In other words, are funds better in picking local
stocks than they are in picking distant stocks? I measure funds’ selectivity
in local (distant) stocks by calculating the difference in the returns from lo-
cal (distant) holdings and the returns from local (distant) stocks not held by



































where Sft−1 is the set of stocks held by fund f at the end of quarter t−1, Lft−1 is
the set of local stocks available to fund f , wfs,t−1 is fund f ’s portfolio weight of
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stock s at the end of quarter t−1, wMs,t−1 is stock s’s market portfolio weight at
the end of quarter t−1, and r̂s,t is DGTW-adjusted return of stock s in quarter
t. Each quarter, the average local performance, PLt (P
D
t ), is calculated as the
cross-sectional dollar-weighted average of the local (distant) performance of
all mutual funds in the sample. The figures reported in the last line of each
panel in Table 5 correspond to PL and PD, the time series average of PLt and
PDt , respectively.
This approach is compelling because it takes into account the geographical
variations in stock returns. Although Coval and Moskowitz (2001) find that
local holdings outperform local stocks that are avoided by mutual funds by
2.04% (= PL) during the 1985-1994 period, they do not report the average
funds’ performance in distant stocks (PD). Consequently, they do not draw
any conclusion on whether funds are better in picking local vs. distant stocks.
Using my sample, I find that local holdings outperform other local stocks by
1.87% (= PL) during the 1985–1994 period (as reported in column (2) on the
last line of Panel B of Table 5). However, distant holdings of mutual funds
also outperform distant stocks not held by mutual funds by 1.63% (= PD)
during this period. The annualized difference between local and distant per-
formance is only 23 basis points between 1985 and 1994. Moreover, I observe
a negative local performance during the second subperiod of my sample: local
holdings slightly underperform relative to other local stocks between 1995 and
2004. In the aggregate sample (1985–2004), local and distant outperformances
are not significantly different: local outperformance is lower than distant out-
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performance by 0.49%.19,20 In summary, mutual funds’ superior stock-picking
ability is not limited to local stocks; if anything, their distant holdings con-
tribute more to their performance than do their local holdings. The findings
so far suggest that although mutual funds are more confident in their local
information, there is no evidence of superior local performance in their stock-
holdings.
2.4.3. Price Impact and Performance
In this subsubsection I focus on the performance differential between local
and distant investments in circumstances in which the expected price impact
of local mutual fund is low. To proxy for the expected price impact of local
mutual funds’ trading, I first use the following variable which is the aggregate
asset size of mutual funds located within 100 km of each stock divided by the








where Ls is the set of all local funds that can invest stock s, Assetft is fund f ’s
assets at the end of quarter t, MarketCaps,t is stock s’s market capitalization
at the end of quarter t. This variable is intended to capture the likelihood of
local investments in a particular stock: a high value of this variable proxies for
19Mutual funds may have restrictions that prevent them from holding some stocks. In an
unreported analysis, I exclude stocks with smaller market capitalizations than the smallest
stock in each mutual fund’s holdings. The results are quantitatively similar.
20Quantitatively similar results are obtained when funds located in Boston and New York
are excluded.
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a higher likelihood of local investments.21 Second, I use a mutual fund density
variable which is measured as as the number of mutual funds located within
100 km of a particular fund divided by the number of all mutual funds in the
sample for that quarter. This variable is intended to proxy for the level of
local competition for a particular fund: a high value of this variable proxies
for a higher level of local competition.
To measure the impact of local money on the performance of local invest-
ments, stocks are sorted quarterly into two halves based on their LocalMoney
variable. Panel D of Table 5 reports mutual funds’ holding returns and per-
formance in stocks in the bottom half of LocalMoney. Consistent with the
hypothesis that the difference in the returns of local and distant investments
will be higher in stocks with relatively low local investor population, mutual
funds’ local holdings of low LocalMoney stocks outperform their distant hold-
ings of these stocks by 2.57% after DGTW adjustment. Moreover, mutual
funds also show better local selectivity in low LocalMoney stocks as local low
LocalMoney stocks held by mutual funds outperform local low LocalMoney
stocks not held by 3.22%. The difference between local and distant perfor-
mance in low LocalMoney stocks is a statistically significant 3.01% (t=2.05).22
21I also try a similar variable which is measured as the weighted sum of the asset size of
mutual funds located within 100 km of each stock. In order to take the local investment
opportunities of each fund into account, each mutual fund is weighted by the inverse of its
aggregate local stock market capitalization. The results using this variable are similar to
the reported results using the LocalMoney variable.
22Although its statistical significance is reduced when the sample is separated into two
10-year subperiods, this result is robust as the difference in performance is similar between
the two subperiods.
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In order to measure the effect of local fund competition on the profitability of
local investments, each fund is categorized quarterly as either a remote fund
or a high-density fund using its mutual fund density. To ensure that funds
located in the major metropolitan areas that are associated with high mutual
fund population (e.g., New York/New Jersey and Boston) are categorized as
such, I choose a cutoff density of 2.5 per cent. Funds located within 100
km of more than 2.5 per cent of mutual funds in each quarter is classified
as high-density funds. The rest are categorized as remote funds. The local
and distant performance of remote funds are reported in Panel E of Table
5. Consistent with the hypothesis that the difference in returns of local and
distant investments will be higher for remote funds, these funds tend to do
better in local stocks. Local stocks held by these funds outperform both distant
stocks held by these funds (by 53 bps) and the local stocks not held by these
funds (by 3.42%). More importantly, the average annualized local performance
of these funds is 2.88% (t=1.76) higher than their average distant performance.
Taken as a whole, the findings in Panels D and E of Table 5 are consistent
with the hypothesis that local performance is negatively correlated with the
expected price impact of local funds.
2.5. Concluding Remarks
This study provides evidence on the relationship between investment loca-
tion and performance. Analyzing the equity holdings of a large sample of
actively managed mutual funds, I find that mutual funds as a group do not
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perform markedly better in their local holdings relative to their distant ones.
This finding is in line with the lack of consistent supportive evidence for local
superior performance in the literature. The absence of superior local perfor-
mance does not by itself rule out the possibility that local funds actually have
better private information. This study exploits the geographical variations in
mutual fund trading behavior to provide evidence supporting a new explana-
tion for the absence of superior local performance.
The main premise of this explanation is that local investors do have some in-
formational advantage, but the price impact associated with their presence in
the market limits their ability to profit from this advantage. After developing a
parsimonious model that formalizes this explanation, I show that mutual funds
perceive their local information quality to be higher by testing two hypothe-
ses from the model. First, consistent with the hypothesis that mutual funds
perceive their local information quality to be higher, local stock initiations are
associated with larger initiation positions and lower pre-initiation institutional
ownerships. Second, consistent with the hypothesis that a higher perception of
information quality reduces the prevalence of trend-chasing behavior, mutual
funds are less likely to chase return trends in local stock initiations than in
distant stock initiations. Moreover, distant funds also seem to perceive local
funds as having superior information because the former appear to mimic the
latter by buying stocks that had experienced an increase in local fund holdings.
These findings are consistent with a perception in the mutual fund industry
that local funds have an informational advantage.
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Since this perception is not borne out in the relative performance of local
and distant mutual fund holdings, I test and find evidence for the model’s pre-
diction that superior local performance should obtain in situations in which
the expected price impact of local mutual funds is low. This finding is consis-
tent with local funds possessing some actual information advantage. Taken as
a whole, the model and the empirical findings suggest that local mutual funds
may have some informational advantage but their ability to profit from this
advantage is limited by the price impact of their trading.
2.6. Proofs
2.6.1. Proof of Equations (5) and (6)
Given her optimal demand at t=1, the expected utility of agent i after the
trading session at t=1 is:
















The first term inside the bracket is the profit from t=0 to t=1, while the second
term is the profit from t=1 to t=2.
The optimal trading strategy of agent i at t=0 is one that maximizes the
expected utility at t=0, E[U i|Fi0]. Using the law of iterated expectations, this
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expected utility can be written as:
E[U i|F i0] = E[E[U i|F i1]|F i0] (11)
= E[E[U i|F i0, (P̃1 − P̃0)]|F i0] (12)
= E[E[E[U i|F i0, (P̃1 − P̃0), (E[x̃|F i1]− P̃1)]|F i0, (P̃1 − P̃0)]|F i0](13)
Since all the random variables are normally distributed and each agent’s utility
function has an exponential form, a closed-form solution can be obtained for
each conditional expectation.23 Taking the first order condition of the result-
ing equation with respect to hi0 (which is equal to d
i
0) followed by a further
simplification give rise to equations (3) and (4). ¥
2.6.2. Proof of Proposition 1
The difference between local agents’ and distant agents’ demands is the
difference between equations (3) and (4):
d̃L0 − d̃D0 = τ{φx(x̄− P̃0) + φL0 (s̃L0 − P̃0)} − τ{φx(x̄− P̃0)} (14)
= τ{φL0 (s̃L0 − P̃0)} (15)
23The resulting equation is very similar to the one in Brennan and Cao (1997).
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Using the equilibrium price function in equation (8), we can rewrite this equa-
tion as:












Therefore, local agents’ demand is higher than distant agents’ demand in equi-













Simplifying the terms gives rise to the following condition:




It is important to note that the noise traders’ demand is zero on average.
Therefore, local traders with private signal higher than the unconditional prior
demand more asset, on average, than distant traders at t=0. ¥
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2.6.3. Proof of Proposition 2
Using the demand function in equation (5), we can rewrite the demand of local
agents at t=1 in equation (4) as:
d̃L1 = τ(φ
x + φL0 )(P̃0 − P̃1) (19)
= −τ(φx + φL0 )(P̃1 − P̃0). (20)
Using the market clearing condition, distant agents’ demand function can be
rewritten as:
d̃D1 = ατ(φ
x + φL0 )(P̃1 − P̃0)− d̃N1 . (21)
¥
2.6.4. Proof of Proposition 3












































1985–1994 441 8.61% 8.01% 0.60% (2.97)







New York 429 22.95% 27.06% -4.11% (-7.00)
  (incl. NJ and CT suburban area)
San Francisco Bay Area 93 13.55% 7.90% 5.65% (5.91)
Chicago 71 6.99% 7.04% -0.05% (-0.08)
Philadelphia 82 5.88% 6.10% -0.22% (-0.48)
Atlanta 25 4.34% 4.59% -0.25% (-0.64)
Los Angeles 60 5.32% 4.07% 1.26% (2.26)
Seattle 28 5.17% 3.04% 2.13% (3.98)
Dallas 12 4.74% 3.03% 1.72% (1.43)
Boston 286 4.97% 2.97% 2.00% (11.52)
Washington, DC 16 10.98% 2.40% 8.58% (1.73)
  (incl. MD and VA suburban area)
Houston 42 4.39% 2.34% 2.05% (4.46)
Other metropolitan areas 653 5.08% 3.31% 1.77% (9.23)
  and rural areas
This table reports the fraction of fund assets invested in stocks located within 100 kilometers.
The first column reports the number of unique funds within each group. The second column
reports the asset-weighted average of mutual funds' local portfolio weights. The third column
reports the percentage of market portfolio located within 100 kilometers of each fund. The last
column reports the difference and the t-stat (adjusted following Newey and West (1987) using a
lag of 4 quarters; in parentheses). Panel A reports the average weights for all funds in the
sample. Panel B reports the subperiod averages, while Panel C reports the averages for funds
located in various metropolitan areas (sorted by local market portfolio weight).
     Difference
     Difference
     Difference
Panel A. All Funds
Panel B. Subperiods
Panel C. Metropolitan Areas
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Table 2.2





Normalized Institutional Ownership 9.36% 10.84% -1.48% (2.87)
Average Abnormal Return 7.19% 8.58% -1.38% (2.95)
Median Abnormal Return 3.67% 4.68% -1.01% (3.85)
Percent with Positive Abnormal Return 58.69% 59.88% -1.19% (1.80)
As a Percent of All Stock Investments 1.09% 0.96% 0.13% (7.90)
Controlling for Characteristics 0.11% (9.07)
Controlling for Characteristics and 
Fixed Effects 0.03% (3.39)
Panel B. Initiation Size
This table reports the pre-initiation stock characteristics as well as the initiation size as a
function of geographical proximity to the initiating mutual fund. For each fund, a stock whose
headquarter is located less than 100 km from that fund's location is categorized as a local stock.
Otherwise, the stock is categorized as a distant stock. Panel A reports the pre-initiation
institutional ownership normalized by the institutional ownership in the year prior to initiation,
average and median market-adjusted stock returns in the pre-initiation quarter, and the
percentage of stocks with positive abnormal return in the pre-initiation quarter.
     Difference
Panel B reports the average size of new stock positions as a percentage of the aggregate dollar
value of fund's stock holdings. The second row reports the estimated parameter for the local
dummy variable (which takes the value of one for local stocks and zero for distant stocks)
obtained from regressing initiation size on stock and fund characteristics. The characteristics
include the stock's market value at the beginning of the initiation quarter, the initiation quarter
stock return, the initiation quarter stock turnover, and the size of the fund at the beginning of the
initiation quarter. The third row reports the estimated parameter for the local dummy variable
obtained from adding fund and quarter fixed effects to the regression in the second row. The
appropriate statistical tests (t /Wilcoxon rank-sum/binomial) are reported in parentheses. 
Panel A. Pre-Initiation Stock Characteristics
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Table 2.3
Fama-MacBeth Style Probit Regression of Initiation Probability










 *Local (-1.73) (-2.29)
Log(Market Value) 0.294*** 0.097***
(11.12) (4.78)
Log(Fund Size) 0.100*** 0.038***
(4.34) (3.17)
Fund Return -0.604 -0.003
(-1.13) (-0.02)
Fund Flow -0.053 -0.049
(-0.32) (-0.41)
N 7,207,173 8,329,539
Pseudo R2 3.64% 3.08%
This table presents the marginal effects from probit regressions of the likelihood of stock
initiation. The probit marginal effects are calculated annually, and the time-series averages
(and t-stats) are reported. The dependent variable is one if a fund initiates a position in quarter t
and zero otherwise. The main independent variables are local dummy (which takes a value of
one if the the fund-firm pair is located within 100km), stock return in quarter t -1 and their
interaction. The control variables are fund size and stock market cap at the beginning of t
fund returns for the last year (ending at the end of t -1), and fund flow in t -1. 
Column (1) reports the estimates for Russell 1000 stocks, while column (2) reports the
estimates for Russell 2000 stocks. The largest one thousand stocks by market capitalization
(that meets the requirements described in Frank Russell Company's website) are included in
Russell 1000, while the next two thousand stocks are included in Russell 2000. Since the
Russell lists are not available for years prior to 1994, market capitalization is used to assign
stocks to Russell 1000 and Russell 2000 pseudo portfolios in those years. The total number of
observations and average pseudo R-square are reported at the bottom of each panel. Numbers
are reported in percentages, and *, **, and *** indicates statistical significance at 10%, 5% and




Panel A. Probability of Distant Initiation in Quarter t (Average=0.87%)
Past Quarter Return Negative Positive Difference
Negative 0.67% 0.84% 0.17% (t =4.89)
Positive 1.17% 1.29% 0.12% (t =2.97)
Difference 0.50% (t =8.32) 0.45% (t =6.35)
Panel B. Probability of Local Initiation in Quarter t (Average=1.02%)
Past Quarter Return Negative Positive Difference
Negative 0.86% 0.89% 0.04% (t =0.44)
Positive 1.28% 1.46% 0.19% (t =1.58)
Difference 0.42% (t =3.67) 0.57% (t =4.43)




Distant Ownership Change t-1  0.493
(0.47)
Local Ownership Change t-1  1.358**
(2.18)















This table present the evidence on mimicking behavior of mutual funds. Panel A (B) presents the
initiation probabilities of distant (local) stocks sorted by the return in the past quarter and the changes in
local (distant) ownership. Local (distant) mutual fund ownership is defined as the aggregate percentage
ownership of local (distant) funds in a particular stock. Panel A presents the initiation probability of
distant stocks (those with headquarters located outside the 100 km radius from the fund headquarters) as
a function of past return and changes in local ownership. Panel B presents the initiation probability of
local stocks (those with headquarters located within 100 km) as a function of past return and changes in
distant ownership. The initiation probabilities are calculated each quarter and the time-series averages,
differences and t-stats are reported.
Panel C presents the marginal effects from probit regressions of the likelihood of stock initiation. The
probit marginal effects are calculated annually, and the time-series averages (and t-stats) are reported.
The dependent variable is one if a fund initiates a position in quarter t and zero otherwise. The main
independent variables of interest are changes in local and distant mutual fund ownerships in the
previous quarter. The control variables are stock return in quarter t-1, fund size and stock market cap at
the beginning of t-1, fund returns for the last year (ending at the end of t-1), and fund flow in t-1. The
coefficients for the last four control variables are not reported. Column 1 reports the estimates for local
stocks, while column 2 reports the estimates for distant stocks. The total number of observations and
average pseudo R-square are reported at the bottom of each column. Numbers are reported in
percentages, and *, **, and *** indicates statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Change in Distant Ownership in t-1
Change in Local Ownership in t-1
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Table 2.5
Comparison of Local and Distant Mutual Fund Performance 
All Stocks Local Distant
(1) (2) (3)
Held by Mutual Fund rH,$ 1.15 1.22 1.13 0.09 (t=0.10)
Not Held by Mutual Fund rNH,MC -0.14 0.35 -0.23 0.58
Difference (= rH,$ – rNH,MC) 1.29 0.87 1.36 -0.49 (t=-0.55)
Panel B. 1985–1994
Held by Mutual Fund rH,$ 1.73 1.79 1.70 0.09 (t=0.08)
Not Held by Mutual Fund rNH,MC 0.06 -0.08 0.06 -0.14
Difference (= rH,$ – rNH,MC) 1.66 1.87 1.63 0.23 (t=0.19)
Panel C. 1995–2004
Held by Mutual Fund rH,$ 0.50 0.58 0.51 0.08 (t=0.06)
Not Held by Mutual Fund rNH,MC -0.37 0.82 -0.56 1.38
Difference (= rH,$ – rNH,MC) 0.87 -0.24 1.06 -1.30 (t=-0.99)
Held by Mutual Fund rH,$ 0.44 2.75 0.18 2.57 (t=1.94)
Not Held by Mutual Fund rNH,MC -0.07 -0.46 -0.03 -0.44
Difference (= rH,$ – rNH,MC) 0.51 3.22 0.21 3.01 (t=2.05)
Held by Mutual Fund rH,$ 0.57 1.05 0.52 0.53 (t=0.26)
Not Held by Mutual Fund rNH,MC -0.26 -2.37 -0.02 -2.35
Difference (= rH,$ – rNH,MC) 0.83 3.42 0.54 2.88 (t=1.76)
Panel E. Funds in Relatively Remote Area
This table reports the time series average of DGTW-adjusted quarter t's returns for stocks held and not
held by mutual funds based on quarter t-1's reported fund holdings. Dollar-weighted (first line of each
panel; rH,$) average returns are calculated for fund holdings and adjusted for each fund, and then
averaged across funds (value-weighted by fund asset value) each quarter. For stocks not held, value-
weighted average returns are calculated and adjusted for each fund, then averaged across funds (value-
weighted by fund asset value) each quarter, and reported in the second line of each panel (rNH,MC
reports. The mutual fund performance (rH,$ – rNH,MC) is reported in the last line of each panel. The first
column presents the figures for all funds, while the second (third) column reports the figures for local
(distant) holdings of mutual funds with positions in both local (<100 km) and distant (>100 km) stocks.
The time-series averages are reported. All numbers are reported in annualized percentages. Time-series
t-stats are in parentheses.
Panel A reports the figures for the whole sample, while Panels B and C report the subsample averages.
Panel D reports the averages and differences for the subsample of stocks in the bottom half of local
money, which is measured as the size of local mutual fund assets divided by the market capitalization of
the stock. Panel E reports the figures for funds located in remote areas, which are areas with less than
2.5% of mutual fund population within 100 km radius in each quarterly sample. 
Local – Distant
(4)
Panel A. Whole Sample (1985–2004)
Panel D. Stocks with Relatively Scarce Local Money
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Figure 2.1 
Average Trading Profits as a Function of the Relative Size of Local Agents 
 
This figure reports the average abnormal trading profits of local agents relative to those of distant agents 
as a function of local agents’ informational advantage and their relative size in the population.  The 
bottom-left axis (Relative Size) corresponds to α, the relative population of local agents, while the 
bottom-right axis (Local Information Advantage) corresponds to the precision of local agents’ private 
signal ( L0φ ). The other parameters are fixed at the following values: x = 0, 
xφ = 10, NN 10 φφ = = 15, 1φ = 
10, andτ = 10.   
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Figure 2.2 
Average Trading Returns as a Function of the Relative Size of Local Agents 
 
This figure reports the average abnormal trading profits of local agents relative to those of distant agents 
as a function of local agents’ informational advantage and their relative size in the population.  The 
trading returns are calculated as the trading profits divided by the sum of the absolute value of each 
agent's position after each trading session.  The bottom-left axis (Relative Size) corresponds to α, the 
relative population of local agents, while the bottom-right axis (Local Information Advantage) 
corresponds to the precision of local agents’ private signal ( L0φ ). The other parameters are fixed at the 
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3. Do Shareholder Preferences Affect Corpo-
rate Policies?
This chapter is structured as follows. Subsection 1 describes the data and
methodology. Subsection 2 presents and discusses the evidence on the het-
erogeneity of institutional preference for financial policies. Subsection 3 doc-
uments the role of institutional preference on firm financial policy choices.
Subsection 4 documents the potential motivations for firms to incorporate in-
stitutional preference in their financial policy choices. Subsection 5 discusses
the evidence on institutional preferences for operating policies. Subsection 6
concludes.
3.1. Data and Definitions
3.1.1. Sample Construction
In this study, I use three main databases: the Thomson Financial 13F
Institutional Holdings database (formerly known as the CDA/Spectrum s34
database), the annual COMPUSTAT database and the monthly CRSP stock
returns database. I restrict the sample to exclude financial firms (SIC codes
6000-6999) and utilities (SIC codes 4900-4949) since these industries are highly
regulated. Although Thomson (CDA/Spectrum) provides quarterly snapshots
of institutional investors’ portfolios extracted from 13F reports filed with the
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SEC24, most of the analyses in this study focus only on reports corresponding
to the institutional holdings in the fourth quarter since I use annual COM-
PUSTAT data to calculate firm financial and operating characteristics. The
sample is limited to the 1980–2005 period since institutional holdings are only
available on the Thomson database since 1980.
Throughout the analysis, I use book leverage as my main measure of lever-
age. Book leverage is defined as (total asset minus book equity) divided by
total asset. Although all of the results are robust to replacing book leverage by
market leverage, book leverage is used to abstract from the changes in leverage
that are driven by the changes in the market valuation of firm equity which in
turn may be related to institutional trading.
3.1.2. Industry- and Characteristics-adjusted Leverage
The literature documents evidence that firms in the same industry and those
with similar characteristics tend to have similar leverages.25 Since institutional
investors may have heterogeneous preferences for industry and firm character-
istics, I employ the following methodology to abstract from the effects of these
24As stated in SEC’s website (http://www.sec.gov/answers/form13f.htm), “institu-
tional investment managers who exercise investment discretion over $100 million or more
in must report their holdings on Form 13F with the SEC [on a quarterly frequency]. [...]
Section 13(f) securities generally include equity securities that trade on an exchange or
are quoted on the Nasdaq National Market, some equity options and warrants, shares of
closed-end investment companies, and some convertible debt securities.”
25Schwartz and Aronson (1967) document evidence that firms within the same industry
show no significant differences in debt ratios. Leverage ratios are also related to various
firm characteristics; for example, leverage is negatively related to research and development
expenditures (Long and Malitz (1985)), growth opportunities (Smith and Watts (1992)),
and profitability (Kester (1986)).
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preferences on their leverage preference. First, I estimate the predicted lever-
age for each firm based on its industry and firm characteristics using a Tobit
regression. The residual from this regression is the component of leverage that
is orthogonal to these industry and firm characteristics. In other words, the
residual is the industry- and characteristics-adjusted leverage. Although their
preferences for raw leverage may partly reflect their preferences for these char-
acteristics, the preference for industry- and characteristics-adjusted leverage
should not be affected by these characteristics. Consequently, the rest of the
analyses use this industry- and characteristics-adjusted leverage instead of the
raw leverage.
As suggested by Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001), a Tobit regression
with the following specification is employed in the first stage:
D/Aft = α + β
′Xft , (22)
where Xft is a vector of firm characteristics that have been used in other cap-
ital structure studies: total assets, profitability, intangible asset, collateral,
market-to-book ratio, age, capital expenditure, R&D expenditure, SGA ex-
penditure, and stock return for the past two years. To control for potential
time-series variations in the condition of financial markets and industries that
may affect firm financial policies, the dependent and independent variables are
defined as the differences from the three-digit SIC industry means for a given
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year.26
The estimated coefficients from this regression are reported in the first col-
umn of Table 3.1.27 For the rest of this study, the focus will be on the adjusted
leverage, D̂/A
f
t , which is the residual from the Tobit regression. The next two
subsections describe how these adjusted leverages are aggregated to approxi-
mate the institutional preferences at the institution level and at the firm level.
3.1.3. Institutional Preference
Since institutional investors’ preferences for firm financial policies are not
directly observable, I infer these preferences from their shareholdings. In par-
ticular, institution i’s preference for characteristic-adjusted leverage, D/Ai,t, is
measured as the dollar-weighted average of the characteristics-adjusted lever-










where Fi,t is the set of all stocks held by institution i at the end of year t and
$fi,t is the dollar amount of institution i’s fund allocated to the stocks of firm
f .
26The results are robust to using other industry definitions such as two-digit SIC or Fama-
French 49-industry classification.
27The coefficients for market-related variables (M/B and stock returns) are considerably
different from the ones in Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001) since I use book leverage
instead of market leverage.
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3.1.4. Firm-Level Institutional Preference
The firm-level institutional preference is measured as the share-weighted










where D/Ai,t is the institutional preference of institution i as defined above.
This firm-level aggregate preference will be referred to as institutional preferred
leverage ratio for the rest of the study.
3.2. Heterogeneity in Institutional Leverage Preference
3.2.1. Heterogeneity in Institutional Holdings
To examine whether there is heterogeneity in institutional leverage prefer-
ence, I start by testing the null hypothesis that the average debt ratios of all
institutional portfolios are the same. This null hypothesis is strongly rejected
for each year in my sample both for raw debt ratios and when the debt ra-
tios are measured relative to target debt ratios based on industry and firm
characteristics.
In order to more directly measure the degree of heterogeneity in institu-
tional preference for leverage28, I sort institutions into annual quintiles based
28An astute reader may argue that each investor can substitute home-made leverage for
firm-made leverage by borrowing/lending on her own. This is not necessarily true for the
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on their revealed preferences (D/Ai,t) and examine how their shareholdings
evolve. The average leverage of stocks held by institutions within each quin-
tile is reported in Panel A of Table 3.2. The average adjusted leverage of firms
held by institutions in the top leverage preference quintile is 6.09%, which is
more than 13 percentage points higher than the average leverage of firms held
by institutions in the bottom quintile.
Although the observed heterogeneity in the leverage of institutional holdings
is quite significant, this heterogeneity may not be caused by the active deci-
sions of these institutions. In other words, if institutions were assigned stocks
randomly, some institutions would end up with high leverage stocks while
others would end up with low leverage stocks. To examine this possibility, I
simulate the distribution of average debt ratios of institutional portfolios by
replacing each stock in each institution’s year-t portfolio with a random stock.
These hypothetical portfolios are sorted annually into leverage quintiles based
on the average leverage ratios of the (random) stocks in these portfolios. The
time-series average of the spread between the top and bottom quintiles is cal-
culated for each simulation run. Panel A of Figure I reports the cumulative
distribution of these simulated averages from 10,000 simulation runs. The ob-
served spread (13.16%) is higher than 99% of the simulated spreads, which
suggests that the the observed heterogeneity in the leverage of institutional
institutional investors in my sample because they may have restrictions on their investment
strategies (e.g., they may only hold equity only or a certain minimum amount of equity).
In this sense, the degree of heterogeneity we observe in the data is related to how binding
these restrictions are for the institutions in my sample.
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holdings is not likely to be caused by random stock selections.
In order to have a better understanding of the extent of institutional prefer-
ence for leverage, I examine whether institutions whose current holdings have
high (low) leverages are more likely to hold and purchase stocks with high
(low) leverages in the future. Panel B of Table 3.2 reports the average lever-
age of stocks held in the year following the ranking year (t+1) by institutions
within each leverage quintile in Panel A. After controlling for industry and firm
characteristics, the stocks held by institutions in the highest leverage prefer-
ence quintile in the preceding year have on average 8.66% higher leverage than
the stocks held by institutions in the lowest leverage preference quintile. This
observed spread is higher than 98% of the simulated spreads reported in Panel
B of Figure I.29
While the persistence in the average leverage of institutional holdings may
be driven by persistent leverage preferences of institutional investors, it may
also be driven by the persistence in their holdings: each institution may hold a
relatively unchanged portfolio for several years. As leverage ratios tend to be
similar from one year to the next, the average debt ratio of each institution’s
portfolio may be similar as well. To control for the persistence in holdings, I
examine the average leverage of stocks initially purchased (holding initiations)
by institutions within each preference quintile.
29As institutional portfolios tend to show some persistence, the random replacement stock
in Panel B is held constant if the stock being replaced is held by a particular institution at
t and t+1.
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Panel C of Table 3.2 reports the average leverage of stocks initiated in the
year following the ranking year (t+1) by institutions within each year-t lever-
age preference quintile. The stocks purchased by institutions in the highest
quintile have on average 3.22% higher leverage than the stocks purchased by
institutions in the lowest quintile. This difference is almost 25 percent of the
difference between the average leverage of firms currently held by institutions
in the top and bottom leverage preference quintiles. As this spread should be
close to zero if institutions do not take leverage into account in their portfolio
selection decisions, the observed spread is higher than almost all of the simu-
lated spreads reported in Panel C of Figure I. The results so far suggest that
the equity holdings and purchasing patterns of institutional investors display
some persistent heterogeneous preferences for firm leverage.
While the discussion so far has focused on the levels of leverage, changes
in leverage may also affect institutional portfolio choices. In particular, in-
stitutional purchases may be related to expected changes in leverage ratios.
To proxy for these (unobserved) expectations, I examine the relationship be-
tween institutional purchases and the recent and future changes in leverage
ratios. In particular, I ask whether institutional investors that currently hold
stocks with high leverage are more likely to purchase new stocks that (i) had
increased their leverage in the recent past or (ii) tend to increase their leverage
in the future. If institutional investors purchase stocks based on the pattern of
past (expected) leverage changes, a relationship between leverage preferences
and recent (future) changes in firm leverage should be observed in institutional
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purchases. I find that the patterns of institutional purchases across institutions
with different leverage preferences are not related to recent, contemporaneous
and future changes in firm leverage.
Contrary to the observed heterogeneous preference for the level of debt ra-
tios, the stock selections of institutional investors do not seem to be correlated
with the expected changes in debt ratios. I find that the patterns of recent,
contemporaneous and future changes in firm leverage are similar for stocks
purchased by institutions in the top and bottom leverage preference quintiles.
3.2.2. Institution Types
As alluded to in the introduction, institutional preference for leverage may
be a result of their beliefs on the economic outlook and the optimal amount of
of debt to alleviate agency issues. The extent to which these beliefs actually
affect the equity holdings and purchases of an institutional investor depends
on the importance of these beliefs relative to this investor’s other investment
objectives. For example, Brickley, Lease, and Smith (1988) establish that in-
surance companies and banks may have either existing or potential business
relationships with firms. These investors may view maintaining these relation-
ships as the main objective of their stock investments. Consequently, their
shareholdings may not fully reflect their preferences for leverage.
Additionally, Bushee (1998) suggests that institutional investors may have
different incentives depending on their investment horizons and investment
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sizes. An investor that invests heavily in each of her holdings will only hold
stocks that match her preference; consequently, her preference will be revealed
strongly in her holdings. On the other hand, the preference of an investor that
aims for a diversified portfolio may not be fully reflected in his holdings since
he may not be able to find enough stocks that match his preference and has
to invest in other stocks.
Contrary to the clear prediction for the effect of investment size on revealed
preferences, the prediction for investment horizon is ambiguous. For exam-
ple, an investor with a long investment horizon may or may not reveal her
preference in her portfolio. As stocks in this portfolio tend to be held for a
relatively long time, it is reasonable to expect these stocks to match her pref-
erence; however, her current portfolio may not reflect her actual preference as
each long-held stock in her portfolio may have changed its characteristics over
time. Similarly, the portfolio of an investor with a short investment horizon
may not reveal his preference since stocks in this portfolio may not be selected
according to his preference given that they are only held for a short horizon.
To examine these predictions, I divide institutional investors into two groups
based on each of the following three classifications. First, I use the classifi-
cation of institutional investors provided by Thomson Financial. Following
the literature30, I separate institutions into two groups: Active institutions,
30Brickley, Lease, and Smith (1988), Almazan, Hartzell, and Starks (2005), and Chen,
Harford, and Li (2006).
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which include investment advisers and investment companies, and Passive in-
stitutions, which include bank trust departments and insurance companies.
The active investors according to this classification are not necessarily activist
investors who take over the firm as in Bethel, Liebeskind, and Opler (1998)
or Denis and Serrano (1996). Moreover, they are also not necessarily activist
investors in the mold of public pension funds as in Carleton, Nelson, and
Weisbach (1998) and Wahal (1996). As reported in columns (1) and (2) of
Table 3.2, banks and insurance companies have considerably weaker revealed
preferences for leverage in their holdings and their purchases than investment
advisers and companies.31
I also use two other distinct classifications to capture the investment strate-
gies of institutional investors as motivated by Bushee (1998). First, institutions
are classified based on the stability of their portfolios to capture their invest-
ment horizons. For each institution, I calculate a Stability variable which









31This evidence is also consistent with banks and insurance companies having more ho-
mogenous beliefs about the magnitude of financial distress costs or the efficacy of debt in
reducing agency issues. Additionally, banks and insurance companies may have relatively
larger holdings of corporate bonds which may reduce the incentive to reveal their preferences
for leverage through their shareholdings.
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where ws,t is the institutional investor’s portfolio weight in firm s at the end of
quarter t and I ews,t>0% is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if stock
s has been held continuously by the institutional investor for the previous two
years and zero otherwise. Institutions with high Stability tend to hold similar
stocks for a long period, while those with low Stability tend to replace stocks
in their portfolio frequently.
Second, institutions are classified based on the concentration of their hold-
ings. For each institution, I calculate a Block variable which is measured as









where ws,t is the institution’s portfolio weight in firm s at the end of quar-
ter t and Iws,t>5% is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if ws,t is
greater than 5% and zero otherwise. Institutions with high Block tend to have
concentrated holdings, while those with low Block tend to have diversified
portfolio.
I divide institutional investors into two groups based on each of these clas-
sifications. Institutions with Stability greater than 1/3 are classified as Stable
institutions, while the rest of the institutions are classified as Dynamic in-
stitutions. Similarly, institutions with Block greater than 1/3 are classified
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as as Concentrated institutions and the rest are classified as Diversified insti-
tutions.32 Consistent with the prediction that institutions that invest heav-
ily in each of their holdings will reveal stronger preference in their holdings,
columns (5)-(6) of Table 3.2 report that institutions with concentrated port-
folios tend to have considerably stronger revealed preferences for leverage in
their holdings and their purchases. As reported in columns (3)-(4) of Table
3.2, institutions with relatively short investment horizon (low Stability) have
considerably stronger revealed preferences for leverage in their holdings and
their purchases. This suggests that the flexibility these institutions have in
constructing their portfolios results in stronger revealed preferences than the
intention of long-horizon institutions to hold stocks according to their prefer-
ence.
3.2.3. Intensity and Persistence of Institutional Preference
In order to further examine how well institutional investors’ holdings rep-
resent their preferences, this section explores the relationship between the in-
tensity and the persistence of institutional investors’ revealed preferences. In
particular, I first construct a proxy for the intensity of institutional investors’
revealed preferences, and then test whether this proxy is positively correlated
with the persistence of these revealed preferences.
32The threshold of 1/3 is arbitrarily chosen such that the number of institutions in each
classification is similar. The results reported here are robust to changing this threshold.
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I estimate the intensity of each institutional investor’s leverage preference
by measuring the dispersion in the excess leverage ratios of the stocks in its
portfolio. An institutional investor with a strong preference for a particular
level of leverage will hold stocks with similar leverage ratios. On the other
hand, the leverage ratios of stocks held by an institutional investor with a
weak leverage preference will tend to look different from each other.
After sorting institutional investors into two annual groups on the leverage
dispersion of its portfolio, I sorted institutions within each group into annual
quintiles based on the average excess leverage of the stocks in their year t’s
portfolios. The within-quintile averages of excess leverage of (1) stocks held
at the end of year t, (2) stocks held at the end of year t+1, and (3) holdings
initiated in year t+1, t+2, t+3, and t+4, respectively, are reported in Table
3.3. Panel A reports the averages for institutions with above-median portfo-
lio leverage dispersion, while Panel B reports the averages for below-median
institutions.
The descriptive statistics of the sorting variable are reported in the first
column (“Residual D/At of Holdings at t”). Comparing the numbers in this
column for Panel A vs. Panel B suggests that institutional investors with
above-median dispersion tend to have weaker revealed preferences as the gap
between the top and bottom quintile is narrower for these institutions relative
to the low-dispersion institutions. This pattern persists for the holdings of
these institutions in the following year.
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More importantly, this pattern persists for the stocks that these institu-
tions initially purchased in the following years. As reported in Panel C, there
are significant differences in the patterns of stocks initially purchased by low-
dispersion institutions vs. high-dispersion institutions. Low-dispersion in-
stitutions tend to show more persistence in their revealed preferences: the
correlation between stocks initially purchased by low-dispersion institutions
and the stocks in their portfolio is higher than the respective measure for
high-dispersion institutions.
In summary, the result in this section suggests that there is some heterogene-
ity in the revealed preferences of institutional investors for leverage. Moreover,
this heterogeneity tends to persist for (at least) several years, in particular for
institutional investors with stronger revealed preferences for leverage.
3.3. Institutional Preference and Financial Decisions
3.3.1. Leverage Ratio Changes
In this section, the focus is on the role of institutional preference in firms’
decision to change their leverage. In particular, I ask whether (and to what
extent) a firm whose leverage ratio is considerably different from the prefer-
ence of its institutional shareholders attempts to reduce the difference. To
answer this question, I assign each firm into one of five annual quintiles based




t ) and the aggregate revealed preferences of its institutional share-
holders (D/A
Inst,f
t ). If institutional preference affects firms’ capital structure
decision, a firm whose leverage ratio is higher (lower) than the preference of
its institutional shareholders should reduce (increase) its leverage ratio.
Panel A of Table 3.4 reports the results from this univariate analysis. Firms
with low leverage ratios relative to the aggregate preferences of their institu-
tional shareholders (first line) tend to increase their leverage, and vice versa.
The difference in leverage change between firms in the highest leverage quin-
tile and those in the bottom quintile is 8.84%. Moreover, the effect is quite
persistent: the difference in the leverage change in the following year (5.40%)
is more than half of the difference in the first year.
In order to control for the potential effects of other firm characteristics on the

















+ γ′Xft , (23)
where D/Aft is firm f ’s industry- and characteristics-adjusted leverage ratio at
year t, D/A
Inst,f
t is the institutional preferred leverage ratio (i.e., the aggregate
revealed preferences of its institutional shareholders), and Xft is a vector of
firm characteristics that includes financing deficit, total asset, market-to-book
ratio, profitability, intangible asset, collateral, capital expenditure, R&D ex-
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penditure, SGA expenditure, and stock return for the past two years. Year
fixed effects are also included in this regression to allow for potential time-
series variations in the condition of financial markets that may affect firms’
financial decisions.
Panel B of Table 3.4 reports the coefficient estimates from the multivariate
analysis. The effect of institutional preference on changes in leverage ratios is
robust to the inclusion of firm characteristics. In particular, the point estimate
of β (0.172) corresponds to a 4.36% difference in the change of leverage ratio
for a one standard deviation change in the difference between the institutional
and firm leverage. Column (2) in Panel B reports that the effect of institutional
preference on changes in leverage ratios is slightly weaker for S&P 500 firms.
This suggests that managers of S&P 500 firms are less accommodating to the
preferences of their shareholders relative to managers of non-S&P 500 firms.
This point will be discussed in more detail below.
One may argue that if the institutional preferred leverage ratio is in the
same direction as the target leverage (i.e., zero adjusted leverage), a leverage
change in the direction of the preferred leverage ratio may be driven by the
firm managers’ desire to adjust towards target leverage. In order to control
for this possibility, column (3) reports the coefficients for a regression that






















+ γ′Xft . (24)
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If firms are adjusting towards their institutional preference, the estimate for β
should be positive. If firms are adjusting towards the target leverage, the esti-
mated coefficient on their current leverage, θ, should be negative. In order to
avoid multicollinearity, only firms for which the institutional preferred leverage
ratio has the same sign as but is larger in magnitude than the firm leverage
ratio (see Figure II) are included in this regression. As only about 11% of
firm-year observations are in this category, the standard errors in this regres-
sion are larger than in the regression in column (1). The coefficient for the
difference between institutional preferred and firm leverage ratios in column
(3) is about half of that in column (1) but still significant. This coefficient has
a similar magnitude as the coefficient for the current leverage ratio, suggesting
that the effect of institutional investors’ preference is about as strong as firm
managers’ adherence to target leverage.
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The last set of results (column (4)) in Panel B suggests that the effect of
institutional preference on changes in leverage ratios is quite persistent. The
parameter estimate for the variable corresponding to institutional preference
in the multivariate regressions in which the independent variable is the lever-
age ratio change over the subsequent year is still strongly significant. The
point estimate of β (0.119) corresponds to a 2.03% difference in the change of
leverage ratio for a one standard deviation change in the difference between
the institutional and firm leverage.
3.3.2. Cross-Sectional Analysis: Institution Types
As the results in Table 3.2 suggest that different types of institutional in-
vestors may have different preferences, e.g., active institutional investors (in-
vestment advisors and managers) tend to have stronger revealed preferences
than passive institutional investors (banks and insurance companies), it is rea-
sonable to expect that their preferences may have different effects on firm’s
financial decisions. Since the preferences of different groups of institutional
investors in a particular firm may be similar to each other, I employ three
multivariate regressions with the following specifications to separate the ef-




























t is the aggregate preferences of firm f ’s TypeA institutional
shareholders, D/A
TypeB,f
t is the aggregate preferences of firm f ’s TypeB insti-
tutional shareholders, and (TypeA, TypeB) ∈ {(Active, Passive), (Stable,
Dynamic), (Diversified, Concentrated)}. The coefficient estimates from
these regressions are reported in Table 3.5.
As D/A
TypeB,f
t appears in both the first and second independent variables,
its estimated effect on firm leverage change is (β̂B − β̂A). Consequently, the
difference between the estimated effect of TypeA shareholders (β̂A) and that
of TypeB shareholders is:
β̂A − (β̂B − β̂A) = 2 · β̂A − β̂B.
For Active vs. Passive shareholders, the difference is 0.056 (p = 0.19). While
this difference is not statistically significant, the difference between Stable
and Dynamic shareholders [0.069 (p = 0.06)] and between Diversified and
Concentrated shareholders [0.170 (p < 0.01)] are statistically significant and
larger in magnitude.
While institutions with more flexibility in their holdings (concentrated and
dynamic institutions) have considerably stronger revealed preferences for lever-
age, the results in Table 3.5 suggest that less-flexible institutions (i.e., stable
and diversified institutions) tend to have stronger impacts on firm’s financial
policy. This seems to suggest that the latter institutions try to make up for
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their inability to select stocks based on their preferences and fully reveal their
preferences in their shareholdings by exerting their preferences more forcefully
on the firms in their portfolios.
3.3.3. Intra-Firm Heterogeneity in Institutional Preferences
In this section, I explore the hypothesis that firm managers will be more
(less) likely to accommodate the preferences of their shareholders if the pref-
erences of these investors are more similar (heterogeneous). The heterogeneity
in the institutional shareholders’ preferences of each firm is proxied using three
variables: (1) the inter-quartile range of the preferences of institutional share-
holders, (2) the standard deviation of these preferences, and (3) the number
of institutional shareholders. At the end of year t, each firm is assigned into
quintiles based on each of these three variables. Panel A of Table 3.6 reports
the pair-wise quintile correlations among these variables.
Panel B reports the coefficients from the regression of the change in excess
leverage on various firm characteristics and year fixed effects. The dependent
variable is the change in excess leverage in year t+1. In addition to the ex-
planatory variables included in Table 3.4, two indicator variables are included
in each of these regressions: “Low Heterogeneity” which takes the value of
one if the heterogeneity proxy is in the lowest quintile and zero otherwise,
and ”Medium Heterogeneity” which takes the value of one if the heterogeneity
proxy is in the middle three quintiles and zero otherwise. The main vari-
ables of interest are the interactions between these indicator variables and the
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gap between the firm’s institutional preferred leverage and its excess leverage




































+ αLILowHeterogeneity + αMIMediumHeterogeneity +
+ γ′Xft . (26)
Consistent with the hypothesis that firms whose shareholders have similar
preferences are more likely to accommodate the preferences of their sharehold-
ers relative to firms whose shareholders have heterogenous preferences, firms
with low values of investor heterogeneity proxies exhibit stronger correlations
between aggregate shareholder preferences and financial decisions. The point
estimates of βLH suggest that the effect of institutional preferences on corpo-
rate policies is about 15% higher for firms with low values of heterogeneity
proxies relative to the corresponding effect for firms with high values of het-
erogeneity proxies.
While the coefficient estimates of βLH are statistically significant, the eco-
nomic magnitude seems to suggest that the effect of institutional investors
preference on corporate policies is achieved mostly through the aggregate pref-
erence as the effect of institutional investors preference on corporate policies
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is still relatively strong (about 15%) for firms with high values of heterogene-
ity proxies. This seems to suggest that the effect of institutional investors
on corporate policies comes through trading as opposed to voting or direct
influencing.
3.3.4. Cross-Sectional Analysis: Firm Characteristics
Column (2) in Panel B of Table 3.4 reports that the relationship between
institutional preference and future changes in leverage ratios is slightly weaker
for S&P 500 firms. As S&P 500 firms tends to have larger (potential) investor
bases than other firms, their managers may be less likely to accommodate
the preferences of their current shareholders. This observation motivates the
following hypothesis: firm managers will be less likely to accommodate the
preferences of their shareholders when they have lower incentives to do so. To
formally test this hypothesis, I divide firms into five quintiles each year based
on size (i.e., total asset) and age (i.e., number of years since first appearance
in COMPUSTAT). Firms in the top size quintile are categorized as “Large”
firms, while those in the bottom quintile are categorized as “Small”. Similarly,
firms in the top age quintile are categorized as “Old”, while those in the
other extreme quintile are categorize as “Young”.33 The indicator variables









the variation in institutional effects on firms from different size/age groups. In
33This threshold (i.e., quintiles) is admittedly arbitrary. However, the results are similar
if thirds, quartiles, or deciles are used instead.
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I hypothesize that managers of older and larger firms are less likely to accom-
modate the preferences of their current shareholders since these shareholders
are more easily replaceable due to the larger potential investor bases of these
firms.
Consistent with this hypothesis, columns (1) and (2) of Table 3.7 report that
the coefficients on the interaction terms with Large (βLarge) and Old (βOld) are
significantly positive. On the other hand, the coefficients on the interaction
34The indicator variables are not included by themselves in the regressions since Xft
includes the continuous versions of these variables: log(Size) and log(Age). The results are
similar whether these indicator variables are included or not. Similar results also obtain if
the continuous variables are used instead of the indicator variables in the interactions.
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terms with Small (βSmall) and Young (βY oung) are negative. The point esti-
mates of βLarge and βSmall suggest that the effect of institutional preferences of
corporate debt ratio is reduced by 18% for large firms and increased by 48% for
small firms (relative to firms in the middle three size quintiles). Similarly, the
effect of institutional preferences is reduced by 31% for old firms and increased
by 30% for young firms (relative to firms in the middle three age quintiles).
The previous test is an indirect test of how the relative powers of institu-
tional investors and firm managers affect their interaction. To more directly
test the effect of relative powers on the shareholder-manager relationship, I
identify CEOs with weaker career concerns by constructing the following proxy





1, if the firm’s CEO is over 60 years old and
also holds the chairman position
0, otherwise
In order to test whether these Powerful CEOs are less likely to accommodate
the preferences of their shareholders due to their weaker career concerns, I
35Since ExecuComp only tracks S&P 1500 firms from 1992, the sample is much smaller
than the full sample. More importantly, the ExecuComp sample consists of relatively older
and larger firms than the full sample.
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+γPowerfulCEO IPowerfulCEO + γ
′Xft . (29)
As reported in column (3) of Table 3.7, the presence of a CEO with weaker
career concerns reduces the effect of institutional preference on future lever-
age decisions. Overall, the results in this section suggest that institutional
investors play a less significant role in corporate decisions when their positions
are relatively weaker.
3.3.5. Debt-Equity Choices
Although the results in previous sections suggest that firms tend to reduce
(increase) their leverage ratios when these ratios are higher (lower) than the
aggregate preferences of their institutional shareholders, these results do not
indicate whether institutional preferences affect firms’ financing choices when
they raise new funding or retire/repurchase existing capital. If institutional
preferences affect security choices, firms needing new capital should be more
(less) likely to issue debt than to issue equity when their leverage ratios are
lower (higher) than the aggregate preferences of their institutional sharehold-
ers, and vice versa. Similarly, firms with excess capital should be more (less)
likely to repurchase shares than to repay debt when their leverage ratios are
89
lower (higher) than the aggregate preferences of their institutional sharehold-
ers.
In order to examine the extent to which institutional preferences affect se-
curity choices, I focus on firms that issue/repurchase debt or equity. Firms
are defined as issuing (repurchasing) a security when the net amount issued
(repurchased) exceeds 5% of the book value of assets. Each issuer/repurchaser
is assigned into one of three groups (top, middle three, and bottom quin-
tiles) based on the difference between its characteristics-adjusted leverage ra-
tio (D̂/A
f
t ) and the institutional preferred leverage ratio (D/A
Inst,f
t ) within
each year. The first two columns of Panel A in Table 3.8 report the proba-
bility that a firm in each group chooses to take a leverage-increasing action
(issue debt/repurchase shares) instead of a leverage-reducing action (issue eq-
uity/repay debt) when it raises new funding or reduces its capital. Panel B
reports the marginal effects from a multivariate probit regression that includes
target leverage (from Tobit regression in Table 3.1) and other firm character-
istics that are related to the debt-equity decision.
The results in Panel A suggest that firms are more likely to take leverage-
increasing actions (issue debt or repurchase shares) than to take leverage-
decreasing actions (issue equity or repay debt) when their leverage ratios are
below the aggregate preferences of their institutional shareholders, and vice
versa. These institutional effects are weaker when firms need capital (col. 1)
than when they distribute extraneous capital (col. 2). These results are robust
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to the inclusion of firm characteristics that may affect the firm’s financing
decisions in Panel B.
Motivated by the above results, I also examine how institutional preference
affect firms’ debt-equity choice when they do not raise new capital. In partic-
ular, I examine the probability that firms recapitalize by increasing leverage
(issuing debt to repurchase shares) instead of decreasing leverage (issuing eq-
uity to repay debt). If institutional preferences affect this choice, firms should
be more (less) likely to undertake leverage-increasing recapitalization when
their leverage ratios are lower (higher) than the aggregate preferences of their
institutional shareholders, and vice versa. The last column in Panel A reports
the probability that a firm in each group chooses to take leverage-increasing
actions (issue debt and repurchase shares) instead of leverage-reducing actions
(issue equity and repay debt) when it rearrange its capital structure. The re-
sults here suggest that firms are more likely to undertake leverage-increasing
than leverage-decreasing recapitalization when their leverage ratios are low
relative to the aggregate preferences of their institutional shareholders. This
result is robust to the inclusion of firm characteristics in Panel B.
Overall, the results in Table 3.8 suggest that institutional preferences play
an important role in the debt-equity decisions. However, these preferences
tend to play a more significant role when firms are not in need of capital. This
result may seem counterintuitive if one expects the existing shareholders to be
the potential source for the new capital. Consequently, this result seems to
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suggest that firm managers ignore current shareholders’ preferences because
they need to attract additional and different investors when they issue equity.
3.4. Institutional Preference, Firm Actions, and Stock
Returns
While the results so far suggest that institutional preferences affect firms’
leverage decisions, this section examines potential motivations for firm man-
agers to heed these preferences. One channel through which institutional in-
vestors can voice their displeasure when firm managers ignore their preferences
is by selling their shares. Although firm managers may not give attention to
the resulting change in the shareholder composition per se, institutional selling
tend to be accompanied by negative price pressure which firm managers may
want to avoid for a variety of reasons.
Alternatively, heeding institutional preferences may add value if institutions
act as monitors and help firm managers choose the optimal financial decisions.
Although Wohlstetter (1993) argues that institutional fund managers lack the
ability to effectively monitor management, whether or not this is true is an em-
pirical question. If institutional investors act as monitors and their aggregate
preference corresponds to a more efficient strategy than the current policy of
a particular firm, firm value should increase (decrease) as the firm managers
follow (act against) the aggregate preference of its institutional shareholders.
In contrast to the negative price pressure hypothesis, no price reversal should
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be observed as the reduction in firm value due to the reduction in monitoring
should be permanent.
In this section, I focus on the price changes and institutional exits accom-
panying financing decisions that are consistent with (or against) institutional
preferences. In particular, I use a portfolio approach to estimate the return ef-
fect of following/ignoring institutional preference. Firms are sorted into three
annual portfolios based on the leverage changes made in year t relative to
the difference between its institutional preferred leverage ratio and its excess
leverage ratios at the beginning of year t. The first two portfolios include firms
that make major leverage changes, defined as more than 5% of the gap be-
tween the institutional preferred leverage ratio and the excess leverage ratio at
the beginning at t: the first portfolio includes firms that make changes in the
direction of institutional preferred ratio (“Follow”), and the second portfolio
includes firms that make changes in the opposite direction (“Ignore”).36 The
last portfolio includes firms that make no or minor leverage changes of less
than 5% of the gap in either direction.
If there is a negative price reaction due to institutional selling following
financing decisions that are against the preferences of these institutional in-
vestors, firms with high leverage ratios relative to the institutional preferred
36It is important to note that “Follow” portfolios include both firms that take leverage-
increasing actions (such as debt issuance, share repurchase, and recapitalization by issuing
debt and repurchasing shares) and firms that take leverage-decreasing actions. This is true
for “Ignore” portfolios as well.
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leverage ratio should be more likely to experience negative price change if these
firms increase their leverage ratios. In other words, firms in the “Follow” port-
folio should outperform those in the “Ignore” portfolio. Moreover, we should
see a long-run reversal of this outperformance if this superior performance
is due to the price pressure associated with institutions selling stocks in the
“Ignore” portfolio.
In the first column of Panel A of Table 3.9, I report the three- and four-
factor alphas of each of these annual (equal-weighted) portfolios as well as a
portfolio consisting of a long position in the “Follow” portfolio and a short
position in the “Ignore” portfolio. After controlling for risk, firms that make
changes in the direction of institutional preferred ratio outperform those that
make changes in the opposite direction by more than 22 bps per month. As
illustrated in the rest of Table 3.9, the superior performance of firms that
make changes in the direction of the preference of their institutional investors
is concentrated in firms whose leverage gap is relatively large (more than 10%
of assets).
In an unreported analysis, I also find that institutional investors are the
most likely to exit firms with low leverage ratios (relative to the preferences
of their institutional investors) that decreases its leverage. Although this ev-
idence is consistent with price pressure associated with institutional selling,
the cumulative four-factor alpha difference of 3.54% in the first year after the
decision is not reversed in the following years. This absence of price reversal
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suggests that institutional investors add positive value through monitoring.
3.5. Institutional Preference and Investment Decisions
While the discussion so far has focused on the relationship between insti-
tutional preference and firm financial decisions, institutional investors may
also affect the investment decisions of firms in their portfolios. Bushee (1998)
finds that managers are less likely to cut R&D to reverse an earnings decline
when institutional ownership is high. On the other hand, Bushee also finds
that a relatively high ownership by institutions with high portfolio turnover
significantly increases the probability that managers reduce R&D to reverse
an earnings decline. As these results suggest that institutions may have het-
erogeneous preferences for investment policy, this section examines how insti-
tutional preference affect both capital investment (capital expenditures) and
R&D expenditure.
3.5.1. Institutional Preference for Investment and R&D
The institutional preferences for investment and R&D are calculated in a
similar fashion as their preference for leverage. In order to control for in-
stitutional investors’ heterogeneous preferences for industry and firm charac-
teristics, I use the residuals from multivariate regressions which include firm
characteristics and in which the dependent and independent variables are de-
fined as the differences from three-digit SIC industry means for a given year.
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The coefficients from these regressions are reported in the last columns (2) and
(3) of Table 3.1.
In order to measure the degree of heterogeneity in institutional preference
for investment and R&D, I sort institutions into annual quintiles based on
the revealed preferences extracted from their equity holdings. The average
investment (R&D) preference for institutions within each investment (R&D)
preference quintile is reported in the first column of Panel A (B) of Table 3.10.
The average industry- and characteristics-adjusted investment ratio of firms
held by institutions in the top investment preference quintile is 1.92%, which is
3.33 percentage points higher than the average investment ratio of firms held
by institutions in the bottom quintile. Similarly, the average adjusted R&D
ratio of firms held by institutions in the top R&D preference quintile is 3.31
percentage points higher than that of firms held by institutions in the bottom
quintile.
Table 3.10 also reports the average adjusted investment and R&D ratios
of firms held by institutions in the top, middle three and bottom preference
quintiles in the year following the ranking year (t+1). The stocks held by
institutions with investment preference in the highest quintile in the preced-
ing year have on average 1.25% higher investment ratio than those held by
institutions with investment preference in the lowest quintile. This spread is
37.49% of the difference in the ranking year (3.33%), which is relatively low
compared to the corresponding spread in R&D ratio as reported in Panel B
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of Table 3.10 (58.09%=1.92%/3.31%) and in leverage as reported in Table 3.2
(65.90%=8.66%/13.16 %).
The stocks initially purchased by institutions with investment preference in
the highest quintile at the end of the preceding year have on average 0.14%
higher investment ratio than those initially purchased by institutions with
investment preference in the lowest quintile. This spread is only marginally
significant and corresponds to only 4.18% of the difference in the ranking year.
The preference for R&D is only slightly stronger: stocks initially purchased by
institutions with high R&D preference at the end of the preceding year have on
average 0.26% higher R&D ratio than those initially purchased by institutions
with low R&D preference. In summary, both investment and R&D preferences
are significantly weaker relative to the leverage preference reported in Table
3.2.
3.5.2. Investment and R&D Decisions
This section examines whether (and to what extent) a firm whose invest-
ment/R&D ratio is considerably different from the preference of its institu-
tional shareholders attempts to reduce this difference. To control for the po-
tential effects of other firm characteristics on the changes in investment and
















































































t is firm f ’s industry- and characteristics-adjusted
investment and R&D ratios, respectively, at year t, Inv/A
Inst,f
t is the insti-
tutional preferred investment ratio (i.e., the aggregate revealed preferences of
its institutional shareholders), R&D/A
Inst,f
t is the institutional preferred R&D
ratio, and Xft is a vector of firm characteristics that includes financing deficit,
total asset, market-to-book ratio, profitability, intangible asset, collateral, and
firm age. Year fixed effects are also included in these regressions to allow
for potential time-series variations in market condition that may affect firm
investment or R&D decisions.
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The estimated coefficients from these regressions are reported in Table 3.11.
The point estimates of βInv,1 (0.537) and βInv,2 (0.181) correspond to firms
removing 71.8% of the difference between the actual and institutional preferred
investment ratios within two years. The point estimates of βR&D,1 (0.329) and
βR&D,2 (0.040) correspond to firms removing 36.9% of the difference between
the actual and institutional preferred R&D ratios within two years.
These effects are relatively stronger and more immediate than the insti-
tutional effect on leverage. While the institutional effect on leverage in the
second year after the institutional preference is measured is about 60% of the
effect in the first year, the corresponding figures for investment and R&D are
33.76% and 12.26%, respectively. As these results suggest that institutional
investors have the ability to influence investment and R&D decisions more
quickly than they do with leverage decisions, it is not surprising to see that
institutions buy stocks without paying too much attention to how these stocks
fit their investment and R&D preferences (in Table 3.10). In other words,
the results seem to suggest that institutions are more likely to initiate equity
positions in firms according to their preferences if these preferences are less
likely to be heeded once the firms are in their portfolios.
If we assume that managers have more control over the investment and R&D
ratios relative to leverage ratios, these results are also similar to the earlier
result that managers follow institutional preferences more readily when they
have funds to disbursed than when they are in need of new funding: managers
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are more likely to accommodate institutional preferences when it is easier for
them to do so.
3.6. Concluding Remarks
The role of institutional investors in the corporate policy decisions of firms in
their portfolios is still not well understood in the literature. Using the revealed
preferences of institutional investors from their equity holdings, I find that
institutional investors play a significant role in firms’ financial and investment
policies. For example, a firm is more likely to increase leverage through share
repurchases if its current leverage is lower than the aggregate preference of its
institutional shareholders. Moreover, firms that change leverage ratios in the
opposite direction of the aggregate preferences of their shareholders experience
lower stock returns than those that follow the aggregate leverage preferences
of their institutional investors.
In addition to the reported empirical results, this study also offers a novel
empirical approach to infer the heterogenous preferences of institutional in-
vestors. Applying this approach to other types of firm decisions (financial or




Multivariate Regressions Predicting Leverage, Investment and R&D Ratios 
 
The table presents the coefficient estimates from multivariate Tobit regressions of book leverage, investment and R&D ratios on various firm 
characteristics. All variables are demeaned by the three-digit SIC industry annual means. The Tobit specification is used because the dependent 
variables are bounded. Column (1) reports the regression coefficients for leverage, column (2) for investment (capital expenditure), and column (3) 
for R&D.  The last column reports the definition for each independent variable (with # denoting the annual Compustat item number).  Standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. Single (*), double (**) and triple asterisks (***) denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 
  Debt/Asset  Cap. Exp./Asset  R&D/Asset   
Independent Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  Definition 
Intercept   0.007*** (0.0006)  -0.003*** (0.0002)  0.000 (0.0002)   
Book Leverage(D/A)    -0.011*** (0.0013) -0.014*** (0.0014)  (Total asset - book equity) divided by total asset 
Log(Asset)   0.018*** (0.0004)   0.001*** (0.0001)  0.001*** (0.0002)  Total asset, in M [#6] 
ROA  -0.145*** (0.0040)   0.031*** (0.0014) -0.141*** (0.0014)  #13/#6 
Intangible   0.237*** (0.0062)  -0.025*** (0.0022) -0.084*** (0.0025)  #33/#6 
Collateral   0.209*** (0.0042)   0.084*** (0.0015) -0.042*** (0.0017)  (#3+#8)/#6 
Log(M/B)  -0.014*** (0.0012)   0.017*** (0.0004)  0.016*** (0.0005)  (Total asset - book equity + mkt. equity) / total asset 
Log(Age)  -0.004*** (0.0011)  -0.009*** (0.0004) -0.003*** (0.0004)  Years since 1st appearance in Compustat plus one 
Capital Expenditure   0.056*** (0.0098)   -0.000*** (0.0000)  #128/#6 
SGA Expenditure  -0.001*** (0.0001)   0.000*** (0.0001)  0.016*** (0.0039)  #189/#12 
R&D Expenditure  -0.066*** (0.0096)   0.015** (0.0034)    #46/#12 
Two-year Stock Return    0.001*** (0.0004)   0.002*** (0.0002) -0.002*** (0.0002)  Stock returns (2-year period ending in Dec.of year t) 
OLS R2  0.083  0.084  0.159  




Institutional Leverage Preference 
 
The table reports the leverage preferences of institutional investors. The leverage preference of each institution is measured as the dollar-weighted 
average of the excess leverage ratios of stocks held by that institution.  At the end of year t, institutions are sorted into five quintiles based on their 
excess leverage preference.  The industry- and characteristics-adjustment is described in details in Table I.  Panel A reports the average excess 
leverage of stocks held at the end of year t by institutions within each preference quintile. “Investment Companies” institutions include CDA types 
3 (investment companies) and 4 (investment advisors); “Bank & Insurance” include CDA types 1 (banks) and 2 (insurance companies). “Stable” 
institutions are those with more than 1/3 of their holdings continuously held over two years; the rest are categorized as “Dynamic” institutions.  
“Diversified” institutions are those with less than 1/3 of their holdings making up more than 5% of equity under management; the rest are 
categorized as “Concentrated” institutions. Panel B (C) reports the average excess leverage of stocks held at the end of year t+1 (initiated during 
year t+1) by institutions within each year t's preference quintile. All reported figures are in percentages. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are 
adjusted using Newey-West correction for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation.  Single (*), double (**) and triple asterisks (***) denote 
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Panel A. Excess D/At of Holdings at t 
High  6.09 6.65 6.60  7.24 7.36  6.03 13.45  
Middle Three  -0.31 -0.22 1.42  1.10 -0.29  0.09 0.55  
Low  -7.07 -7.21 -3.69  -5.53 -7.76  -6.36 -10.50  
High minus Low  13.16*** 13.86*** 10.29*** 3.57*** 12.77*** 15.11*** -2.34*** 12.40*** 23.95*** -11.55***
  [p=0.0028] (12.57) (18.06) (6.05) (12.04) (12.74) (19.91) (12.07) (17.75) (-20.46) 
Panel B. Excess D/At+1 of Holdings at t+1 
High  4.19 4.36 5.56   5.98 4.79  4.46 9.35  
Middle Three  0.01 0.08 1.80  1.53 0.00  0.44 0.86  
Low  -4.47 -4.49 -1.83  -3.45 -4.29  -4.03 -5.15  
High minus Low  8.66*** 8.85*** 7.40*** 1.45*** 9.42*** 9.09*** 0.34 8.49*** 14.49*** -6.01***
  [p=0.0148] (9.60) (12.36) (3.66) (9.68) (10.02) (0.23) (8.80) (13.89) (-11.05) 
Panel C. Excess D/At+1 of Stocks Initiated in year t+1 
High  0.65 0.34 -0.21   0.15 0.55  0.12 0.94  
Middle Three  -0.59 -0.67 -1.00  -0.42 -0.82  -0.85 -0.08  
Low  -2.57 -2.05 -1.24  -1.35 -1.81  -1.95 -2.15  
High minus Low  3.22*** 2.39*** 1.03** 1.36*** 1.50*** 2.36*** -0.85** 2.07*** 3.09*** -1.02***
  [p<0.0001] (6.60) (2.30) (2.83) (4.04) (5.66) (-2.30) (4.69) (7.45) (-2.78) 
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Table 3.3 
Institutional Preference as a Function of Portfolio Dispersion 
 
The table reports the leverage preferences of institutional investors as a function of the dispersion in the 
excess leverage of their portfolios. For each institutional investor, its portfolio dispersion is measured as 
the (dollar-weighted) standard deviation of the excess leverage of the stocks in its portfolio.  Institutional 
investors are sorted into two annual groups of above- and below- median dispersions.  The within-group 
averages of excess leverage of (1) stocks held at the end of year t, (2) stocks held at the end of year t+1, 
and (3) holdings initiated in year t+1, t+2, t+3, and t+4, respectively, by institutions within each year t's 
preference quintile are reported in Panels A and B.  Panel C reports the difference between the last rows 
of Panels A and B. All reported figures are in percentages.  The t-statistics reported in parentheses are 
adjusted using Newey-West correction for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation.   
 
Panel A. Institutions with Above-Median Dispersions 
Residual D/At of  
Holdings 
Residual D/At of  
Stocks Initiated 
Institutional Leverage 
Preference Quintile  
(at t) at t at t+1 at t+1 at t+2 at t+3 at t+4 
High  4.80  3.90  0.14 -0.04 -0.70 -0.86 
Middle Three -0.17 -0.13 -1.09 -1.50 -0.70 -0.50 
Low -5.92 -4.04 -1.56 -0.97 -1.11 -1.15 
High minus Low 10.73  7.94  1.70 0.94 0.41 0.29 
    (3.62)  (3.21) (2.20) (1.22) 
 
Panel B. Institutions with Below-Median Dispersions  
Residual D/At  of  
Holdings 
Residual D/At of  
Stocks Initiated 
Institutional Leverage 
Preference Quintile  
(at t) at t at t+1 at t+1 at t+2 at t+3 at t+4 
High  7.77  4.77  1.37  0.27 -0.01 -0.26 
Middle Three  0.13 0.12 -0.25 -0.67 -0.75 -1.22 
Low -9.19 -5.16 -2.63 -2.11 -1.75 -1.89 
High minus Low 16.95 9.93  4.00  2.38  1.75  1.63 
    (4.53)  (4.12)  (3.72)  (3.52) 
 
Panel C. Diff-in-Diff 
Residual D/At  of  
Holdings 
Residual D/At of  
Stocks Initiated  
at t at t+1 at t+1 at t+2 at t+3 at t+4 
Low minus High Dispersion 6.22 1.99 2.30 1.44 1.34 1.34 
   (3.21) (2.52) (2.34) (2.21) 
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Table 3.4 
Institutional Preferences and Subsequent Leverage Changes  
 
The table reports the relationship between institutional investors' leverage preferences and firms' 
subsequent leverage changes.  The institutional preferred leverage ratio of a particular firm is measured as 
the share-weighted average of the excess leverage preferences of the firm’s institutional shareholders.  At 
the end of year t, each firm is assigned into one of three leverage groups based on the difference between 
its institutional preferred leverage and excess leverage ratios.  Panel A reports the average percentage 
change in leverage in year t+1 and t+2 for each leverage group. Panel B reports the coefficients from the 
regression of the change in excess leverage on various firm characteristics and year fixed effects. The 
dependent variable is the change in leverage in year t+1 in columns (1) through (3); and the change in 
leverage in year t+2 in column (4). The main independent variable in all columns is the difference 
between a firm's institutional preferred leverage and excess leverage ratios at the end of year t. Column 
(2) includes only S&P 500 firms. Column (3) includes only firms for which the institutional preferred 
leverage ratio has the same sign as but is larger in magnitude than the firm leverage ratio.  The definitions 
for the explanatory variables are provided in Table I.  The standard errors reported in parentheses are 
clustered at the firm level.  Single (*), double (**) and triple asterisks (***) denote statistical significance 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A. Univariate Sort  
(Institution - Firm  
Excess D/At) Quintile 
 Δ Excess D/A  (t to t+1)  
Δ Excess D/A  
(t+1 to t+2) 
High  4.39 2.67 
Middle Three  0.47 0.46 
Low  -4.45 -2.73 
High minus Low   8.84  5.40 
 
Panel B. Multivariate Analysis 
 Δ Excess D/A  (t to t+1)  
Δ Excess D/A  
(t+1 to t+2) Independent Variables 
     (measured at t)  All (1) S&P (2) Diff. (3)  (4) 
Institution - Firm D/A   0.172*** (0.0040)  0.145*** (0.0099)  0.072** (0.0361)   0.090*** (0.0034) 
Firm D/A      -0.067* (0.0364)    
Financing Deficit   0.009*** (0.0027)  0.079*** (0.0216)  0.008 (0.0103)  -0.002 (0.0020) 
Log(Asset)  -0.001***(0.0003)  0.003*** (0.0010) -0.001** (0.0004)   0.001** (0.0003) 
Profitability   0.010 (0.0090)  0.045** (0.0205) -0.022** (0.0108)  -0.099*** (0.0077) 
Intangible  -0.051***(0.0058) -0.073*** (0.0115) -0.033***(0.0079)   0.021*** (0.0053) 
Collateral  -0.017***(0.0036) -0.026*** (0.0086) -0.007 (0.0046)   0.005* (0.0031) 
Log(M/B)   0.002* (0.0012) -0.003 (0.0030)  0.003 (0.0018)  -0.009*** (0.0013) 
Log(Age)  -0.001 (0.0008)  0.005** (0.0023)  0.000 (0.0011)  -0.001* (0.0007) 
Capital Expenditure  -0.027***(0.0097) -0.061** (0.0303) -0.024* (0.0139)   0.028*** (0.0091) 
R&D Expenditure  -0.014 (0.0148) -0.004 (0.0318)  0.036** (0.0178)   0.016 (0.0134) 
SGA Expenditure   0.001*** (0.0002)  0.021** (0.0084)  0.001 (0.0011)  -0.001 (0.0005) 
Two-Year Stock Return  -0.002***(0.0006) -0.002 (0.0021) -0.001 (0.0007)   0.001* (0.0005) 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Adj. R2  0.084 0.090 0.016  0.043 
N   43,013 4,803 4,764   35,125 
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Table 3.5 
Institutional Preferences and Subsequent Leverage Changes 
as a Function of Institutional Investor Characteristics 
 
The table reports the relationship between the leverage preferences of different groups of institutional 
investors and firms' subsequent leverage changes.  The institutional preferred leverage ratio of a particular 
firm is measured as the share-weighted average of the leverage preferences of the firm’s institutional 
shareholders.  This table reports the coefficients from the regression of the change in excess leverage on 
various firm characteristics and year fixed effects.  The dependent variable is the change in leverage in 
year t+1. The main independent variables in column (1) are (a) the difference between the leverage 
preference of "Bank & Insurance” and the firm's excess leverage ratios; and (b) the difference between 
the leverage preference of "Investment Companies” vs. that of "Bank & Insurance”.  The main 
independent variables in column (2) are (a) the difference between the leverage preference of "Dynamic" 
institutional investors and the firm's excess leverage ratios; and (b) the difference between the leverage 
preference of "Stable" investors vs. that of "Dynamic" investors.  The main independent variables in 
column (3) are (a) the difference between the leverage preference of "Concentrated" institutional 
investors and the firm's excess leverage ratios; and (b) the difference between the leverage preference of 
"Diversified" investors vs. that of “Concentrated” investors. The definition for each of these institutional 
investor groups is provided in Table II. The definitions for other explanatory variables are provided in 
Table I.  The standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the firm level.  Single (*), double 
(**) and triple asterisks (***) denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 Δ Excess D/A  (t to t+1) Independent Variables 
     (measured at t)   (1)  (2)  (3) 
InvestmentCo. – Bank&Ins.   0.114*** (0.0219)     
Bank&Ins. – Firm D/A   0.171*** (0.0042)     
Stable – Dynamic      0.121*** (0.0186)  
Dynamic – Firm D/A      0.173*** (0.0043)  
Diversified – Concentrated        0.171*** (0.0113) 
Concentrated – Firm D/A        0.172*** (0.0056) 
Financing Deficit   0.009*** (0.0028)   0.008*** (0.0027)  0.031*** (0.0067) 
Log(Asset)   0.000 (0.0004)   0.000 (0.0004)  0.001 (0.0005) 
Profitability  -0.002 (0.0101)   0.009 (0.0103)  0.008 (0.0110) 
Intangible  -0.049*** (0.0059)  -0.050*** (0.0060) -0.052*** (0.0068) 
Collateral  -0.015*** (0.0038)  -0.016*** (0.0039) -0.020*** (0.0047) 
Log(M/B)   0.003** (0.0013)   0.003** (0.0014) -0.002 (0.0018) 
Log(Age)   0.000 (0.0009)  -0.001 (0.0009)  0.000 (0.0010) 
Capital Expenditure  -0.030*** (0.0101)  -0.033*** (0.0104) -0.021 (0.0135) 
R&D Expenditure  -0.018 (0.0162)  -0.011 (0.0165)  0.003 (0.0201) 
SGA Expenditure   0.001*** (0.0002)   0.001*** (0.0003)  0.001*** (0.0001) 
Two-Year Stock Return  -0.002*** (0.0006)  -0.002*** (0.0006) -0.002** (0.0008) 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes Yes 
Adj. R2  0.084  0.084 0.089 
N   38,754   36,554  20,978 
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Table 3.6 
Heterogeneity in Institutional Preferences and Leverage Changes  
 
The table reports the effect of the heterogeneity in the preferences of a particular firm’s institutional 
shareholders on the relationship between the aggregate institutional preference and the firm's subsequent 
leverage change.  The heterogeneity in the institutional shareholders’ preferences of a particular firm is 
proxied using three variables: (1) the inter-quartile range of the preferences of institutional shareholders, 
(2) the standard deviation of these preferences, and (3) the number of institutional shareholders.  At the 
end of year t, each firm is assigned into quintiles based on each of these three variables.  Panel A reports 
the pair-wise quintile correlations among these variables.  Panel B reports the coefficients from the 
regression of the change in excess leverage on various firm characteristics and year fixed effects. The 
dependent variable is the change in excess leverage in year t+1. The main independent variable is the 
difference between a firm's institutional preferred leverage and excess leverage ratios at the end of year t.  
In addition to the explanatory variables included in Table 3.4 (whose coefficients are suppressed in this 
table), four additional variables are included in each of these regressions: “Low Heterogeneity” (“Medium 
Heterogeneity”), an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the heterogeneity proxy is in the 
lowest quintile (middle three quintiles) and zero otherwise, and their interactions with the main 
independent variable. Each column uses a different proxy for heterogeneity: (1) the inter-quartile range, 
(2) the standard deviation, and (3) the number of institutional shareholders. The standard errors reported 
in parentheses are clustered at the firm level.  Single (*), double (**) and triple asterisks (***) denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Quintile Correlation of Heterogeneity Proxies 
Proxy for Dispersion  Inter-quartile Range Std. Deviation   
Std. Deviation  0.149     
Number of Holders  0.248 0.765   
 
Panel B. Multivariate Analysis 
  Δ Excess D/A (t to t+1) 






Number of Holders 
(3) 
Independent Variables 
     (measured at t)      
Institution - Firm D/A   0.151*** (0.0086)  0.155*** (0.0083)   0.141*** (0.0103) 
* Medium Heterogeneity   0.011 (0.0102)  0.005 (0.0100)   0.026** (0.0115) 
* Low Heterogeneity   0.026** (0.0117)  0.025** (0.0115)   0.025* (0.0130) 
Medium Dispersion   0.001 (0.0018)  0.002 (0.0018)  -0.002 (0.0024) 
Low Dispersion   0.001 (0.0022)  0.008*** (0.0026)   0.003 (0.0035) 
(Other explanatory variables are included, but their coefficients are suppresed) 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2  0.091 0.090 0.090 
N   43,013 43,013 43,013 
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Table 3.7 
Institutional Preferences and Subsequent Leverage Changes 
as a Function of Firm Characteristics 
 
The table reports the relationship between institutional leverage preference and subsequent changes in debt ratios of various types of firms.  This table reports the 
coefficients from the regression of the change in excess leverage on various firm characteristics and year fixed effects.  The dependent variable is the change in 
leverage in year t+1. The main explanatory variables are (a) the difference between the debt ratio preferred by its institutional investors and the firm's excess 
leverage ratio; and (b) its interaction with the following dummy variables. “Large” (“Small”) takes a value of one if the firm is in the top (bottom) annual quintile 
of total asset, and zero otherwise. “Old” (“Young”) takes a value of one if the firm is in the top (bottom) annual age quintile, and zero otherwise. Age is measured 
as the number of years since the firm’s first appearance in Compustat. “Powerful CEO” takes a value of one if the firm’s CEO is over 60 years old and also holds 
the chairman position.  The definitions for other explanatory variables are provided in Table I.  The standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the 
firm level.  Single (*), double (**) and triple asterisks (***) denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  Δ Excess D/A (t to t+1) 
 Full Sample   ExecuComp Firms Independent Variables 
     (measured at t)   (1)   (2)  (3)   (4)   (5) 
Institution - Firm D/A   0.161
*** (0.0047)   0.184*** (0.0049)   0.177*** (0.0117)   0.179*** (0.0148)  0.185*** (0.0139) 
* Large  -0.029*** (0.0084)        -0.011 (0.0157)   
* Small   0.078*** (0.0118)         0.414* (0.2367)   
* Old     -0.057*** (0.0078)        -0.023 (0.0160) 
* Young      0.056*** (0.0168)         0.011 (0.0366) 
* Powerful CEO        -0.034** (0.0158)  -0.030* (0.0159) -0.030* (0.0158) 
Powerful CEO        -0.001 (0.0021)  -0.001 (0.0021) -0.001 (0.0021) 
Institutional Ownership  -0.019*** (0.0025)  -0.019*** (0.0025)  -0.015** (0.0058)  -0.015** (0.0059) -0.014** (0.0059) 
Financing Deficit   0.009*** (0.0028)   0.009*** (0.0028)   0.050*** (0.0191)   0.051*** (0.0188)  0.050*** (0.0190) 
Log(Asset)   0.000 (0.0004)   0.000 (0.0004)   0.002*** (0.0008)   0.002*** (0.0008)  0.002*** (0.0008) 
Profitability   0.014 (0.0090)   0.014 (0.0090)   0.041** (0.0187)   0.044** (0.0177)  0.041** (0.0187) 
Intangible  -0.048*** (0.0057)  -0.050*** (0.0058)  -0.070*** (0.0094)  -0.070*** (0.0094) -0.070*** (0.0095) 
Collateral  -0.015*** (0.0036)  -0.017*** (0.0036)  -0.014** (0.0067)  -0.014** (0.0067) -0.013* (0.0066) 
Log(M/B)   0.004*** (0.0012)   0.004*** (0.0012)  -0.001 (0.0027)  -0.001 (0.0027) -0.001 (0.0027) 
Log(Age)   0.000 (0.0008)   0.000 (0.0008)   0.000 (0.0016)   0.000 (0.0016)  0.001 (0.0016) 
Capital Expenditure  -0.023** (0.0097)  -0.023** (0.0097)  -0.089*** (0.0237)  -0.085*** (0.0239) -0.090*** (0.0237) 
R&D Expenditure  -0.004 (0.0148)  -0.010 (0.0148)  -0.023 (0.0265)  -0.024 (0.0261) -0.022 (0.0265) 
SGA Expenditure   0.001*** (0.0002)   0.001*** (0.0002)   0.001 (0.0028)   0.002 (0.0028)  0.001 (0.0028) 
Two-Year Stock Return  -0.002*** (0.0006)  -0.002*** (0.0006)  -0.002* (0.0014)  -0.002* (0.0014) -0.002* (0.0014) 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R2  0.088  0.087  0.089  0.089  0.089 
N   42,839  42,839  7,752  7,752  7,752 
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Table 3.8 
Institutional Preference and Debt-Equity Choice 
 
The table reports the relationship between institutional leverage preference and firms' subsequent debt-
equity choice. At the end of year t, each firm is assigned into one of three leverage groups based on the 
difference between its institutional preferred leverage and excess leverage ratios: top, medium three, and 
bottom quintiles. Panel A reports the following probabilities for each group: (1) issuing debt vs. issuing 
equity; (2) debt repayment vs. share repurchase; and (3) recapitalization by issuing debt and repurchasing 
shares vs. by issuing shares and repaying debt. Firms are defined as issuing (repurchasing/repaying) a 
security when the net amount issued (repurchased/repaid) divided by the total assets exceeded 5%. Firms 
that do both or neither of each of these pairs of actions in the same year are omitted from the analysis.  A 
higher percentage corresponds to a higher likelihood of firms in each group taking leverage-increasing 
actions. Panel B reports the marginal effects from multivariate probit regressions on various firm 
characteristics. The dependent variables take a value of one if a firm takes a leverage-increasing action. 
The main independent variable is the difference between the institutional leverage preference and the 
firm’s excess leverage ratio. The definitions for other explanatory variables are provided in Table I.  The 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. Single (*), double (**) and triple asterisks (***) denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
Panel A. Univariate Sort  
(Institution - Firm D/At) 
Quintile   
Debt Issue (1)  
vs.  
Equity Issue (0)  
 
Equity Repurchase (1) 
vs.  
Debt Reduction (0) 
  
Recapitalization by 
Issuing Debt (1)  
vs.  
Issuing Equity (0) 
High  68.751  45.484  56.123 
Middle Three  67.399  30.178  41.472 
Low  56.349  17.080  20.662 
High minus Low   12.401  28.404   35.461 
 
Panel B. Multivariate Analysis 
Independent Variables   dy/dx  dy/dx   dy/dx 
Institution - Firm D/A   0.203*** (0.0285)   1.014*** (0.0393)   0.754*** (0.0806) 
Financing Deficit  -0.028* (0.0169)   0.159*** (0.0290)  -0.158** (0.0625) 
Log(Asset)   0.042*** (0.0031)   0.046*** (0.0038)   0.067*** (0.0088) 
Profitability   0.502*** (0.0344)   1.406*** (0.0703)   2.003*** (0.1753) 
Intangible   0.257*** (0.0411)  -0.987*** (0.0513)  -0.505*** (0.1104) 
Collateral   0.198*** (0.0283)  -0.845*** (0.0380)  -0.584*** (0.0871) 
Log(M/B)  -0.160*** (0.0095)   0.154*** (0.0138)  -0.011 (0.0325) 
Log(Age)   0.063*** (0.0075)   0.082*** (0.0099)   0.119*** (0.0212) 
Capital Expenditure   0.281*** (0.0593)  -0.131 (0.1045)  -0.089 (0.1750) 
R&D Expenditure  -0.073*** (0.0269)   0.223*** (0.0507)  -0.477** (0.1970) 
SGA Expenditure   0.001 (0.0009)   0.078*** (0.0143)   0.119** (0.0473) 
Two-Year Stock Return  -0.012*** (0.0028)  -0.022*** (0.0042)  -0.064*** (0.0128) 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Pseudo R2  0.2376  0.3443  0.3922 
N   11,165  8,115   1,739 
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Table 3.9 
Institutional Preference, Financial Decisions, and Stock Returns 
 
The table reports the effect of institutional preference and firms' leverage changes on stock returns in the 
subsequent years. After observing the leverage change in year t, each firm is assigned into three groups based 
on whether the firm makes a leverage change of (1) more than 5% of the “leverage gap” (the difference 
between its institutional preferred leverage ratio and its current excess leverage ratios) in the direction of the 
aggregate institutional preferences (“Follow”), (2) more than 5% of the gap in the opposite direction 
(“Ignore”), or (3) relatively “minor changes” of less than 5% of the gap in either direction.  The three-factor 
and four-factor value-weighted portfolio alphas are then calculated from the beginning of July of year t+1 to 
the end of June of year t+2 for portfolios formed at the beginning of July of year t+1.  Panel A reports the 
alphas for all sample firms, while Panel B (C) report the alphas for firms with above- (below-) median market 
cap at the beginning of July of year t+1.  The second (third) column of each panel reports the alphas for firms 
whose gaps are more (less) than 10 percent of the firm’s asset at the beginning of year t.  The t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. Single (*), double (**) and triple asterisks (***) denote statistical significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
       All Firms       |Gap| > 10%      |Gap| ≤ 10% 
 Panel A. All Firms 
A.1. Three-Factor Alphas       
Follow  0.36*** (3.77)  0.50*** (4.76)  0.20* (1.91) 
Minor Changes   0.40*** (3.61)  0.25* (1.90)  0.69** (4.72) 
Ignore  0.14 (1.29) -0.06 (-0.46)  0.25** (2.30) 
Follow minus Ignore  0.22*** (3.18)  0.56*** (5.35) -0.05 (-0.62) 
             
A.2. Four-Factor Alphas             
Follow  0.16 (1.55)  0.31*** (2.72)  0.00 (0.02) 
Minor Changes   0.20* (1.67)  0.03 (0.18)  0.55*** (3.78) 
Ignore -0.13 (-1.02) -0.36** (-2.39)  0.01 (0.10) 
Follow minus Ignore  0.29*** (4.20)  0.67*** (6.33) -0.01 (-0.13) 
  
 Panel B. Large Firms (Above-Median Market Cap) 
B.1. Three-Factor Alphas       
Follow  0.00 (-0.01)  0.11 (0.99) -0.10 (-0.92) 
Minor Changes   0.32*** (3.11)  0.14 (1.24)  0.59*** (4.04) 
Ignore -0.06 (-0.61) -0.30** (-2.32)  0.04 (0.34) 
Follow minus Ignore  0.06 (0.86)  0.41*** (3.46) -0.14 (-1.58) 
             
B.2. Four-Factor Alphas             
Follow -0.17 (-1.62) -0.07 (-0.59) -0.27** (-2.32) 
Minor Changes   0.19* (1.85)  0.01 (0.07)  0.50*** (3.49) 
Ignore -0.32** (-2.71) -0.59*** (-4.02) -0.20 (-1.64) 
Follow minus Ignore  0.15** (2.10)  0.53*** (4.44) -0.07 (-0.84) 
  
 Panel C. Small Firms (Below-Median Market Cap) 
C.1. Three-Factor Alphas       
Follow  0.76*** (4.66)  0.91*** (5.05)  0.57*** (3.13) 
Minor Changes   0.50** (2.52)  0.40* (1.84)  0.72*** (2.72) 
Ignore  0.34* (1.88)  0.15 (0.73)  0.50*** (2.65) 
Follow minus Ignore  0.42*** (3.64)  0.75*** (4.56)  0.07 (0.42) 
             
C.2. Four-Factor Alphas             
Follow  0.53*** (3.15)  0.70*** (3.81)  0.32* (1.70) 
Minor Changes   0.23 (1.14)  0.10 (0.44)  0.56** (2.13) 
Ignore  0.07 (0.36) -0.15 (-0.66)  0.25 (1.29) 
Follow minus Ignore  0.46*** (4.13)  0.85*** (5.20)  0.07 (0.44) 
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Table 3.10 
Institutional Investment and R&D Preferences 
 
The table reports the investment and R&D preferences of institutional investors. The investment (R&D) 
preference of a particular institution is measured as the dollar-weighted average of excess investment- 
(R&D-) to-asset ratios of stocks held by that institution. At the end of year t, institutions are sorted into 
five quintiles based on their investment (R&D) preference. The industry- and characteristics-adjustment is 
described in details in Table I. Panel A (B) reports the average investment (R&D) ratios for each 
investment (R&D) preference group. The first column in each panel reports the average for stocks held at 
the end of year t by institutions within each preference quintile. The second column reports the average of 
stocks held at the end of year t+1, while the third column reports the average for stocks initially purchased 
during year t+1 by institutions in each year t's preference quintile. All reported figures are in percentages. 
The t-statistics reported in parentheses are adjusted using Newey-West correction for heteroscedasticity 
and serial correlation. Single (*), double (**) and triple asterisks (***) denote statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Investment 
Institutional  
Investment Preference  
Quintile  
(at t) 
Excess Inv/At  
of  
year t's holdings 
Excess Inv/At+1  
of  
year t+1's holdings 
Excess Inv/At+1  
of stocks initially 
purchased in  
year t+1 
High 1.92 0.83 0.34 
Middle Three 0.29 0.23 0.20 
Low -1.41 -0.42 0.20 
High minus Low 3.33*** 1.25*** 0.14* 
  (20.12) (8.12) (1.72) 
 
Panel B. R&D 
Institutional  
R&D Preference  
Quintile  
(at t) 
Excess R&D/At  
of  
year t's holdings 
Excess R&D/At+1  
of  
year t+1's holdings 
Excess R&D/At+1 
of stocks initially 
purchased in  
year t+1 
High 1.34 0.57 0.07 
Middle Three -0.38 -0.43 -0.14 
Low -1.96 -1.35 -0.20 
High minus Low 3.31*** 1.92*** 0.26** 
  (6.95) (5.96) (2.50) 
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Table 3.11 
Institutional Preference and Subsequent Changes in Investment and R&D 
 
The table reports the effect of institutional investors' investment and R&D preference on firms' 
investment decisions.  The institutional preferred investment ratio of a particular firm is measured as the 
share-weighted average of the excess investment-to-asset ratios of other stocks held by institutions 
holding the firm's shares.  The institutional preferred R&D ratio is the share-weighted average of excess 
R&D-to-asset ratios of other stocks held by institutions holding the firm's shares.  The table reports the 
coefficients from a regression of change in excess investment and R&D on various firm characteristics 
and year fixed effects. The dependent variable is the change in investment in year t+1 and t+2 in columns 
(1) and (2), resp.; and the change in R&D in year t+1 and t+2 in columns (3) and (4), resp. The main 
independent variable in columns (1) and (2) is the difference between institutional preferred investment 
ratio and the firm's excess investment ratio.  The main independent variable in columns (3) and (4) is the 
difference between the institutional preferred R&D ratio and the firm's excess R&D ratio.  The definitions 
for the explanatory variables are provided in Table I.  The standard errors reported in parentheses are 
clustered at the firm level.  Single (*), double (**) and triple asterisks (***) denote statistical significance 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
  Δ Excess Investment/A  Δ Excess R&D 
 t to t+1 (t+1 to t+2)  (t to t+1)  (t+1 to t+2) Independent  Var.’s 
     (measured at t)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Institution - Firm          
     Investmentt  0.537*** (0.0137)   0.181*** (0.0111)       
Institution - Firm              
     R&Dt         0.329*** (0.0310)   0.040** (0.0198) 
Log(Asset)   0.000 (0.0002)   0.000* (0.0001)  -0.001*** (0.0002)   0.001*** (0.0001) 
Profitability   0.014*** (0.0030)   0.008*** (0.0029)   0.021*** (0.0083)  -0.041*** (0.0072) 
Intangible  -0.004** (0.0020)   0.001 (0.0015)   0.006** (0.0030)  -0.004 (0.0023) 
Collateral  -0.020*** (0.0018)   0.001 (0.0015)  -0.005** (0.0021)  -0.002 (0.0015) 
Log(M/B)  -0.004*** (0.0007)   0.000 (0.0006)  -0.002* (0.0010)   0.003*** (0.0009) 
Log(Age)   0.002*** (0.0005)   0.001*** (0.0004)  -0.003*** (0.0005)   0.000 (0.0004) 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
Adj. R2  0.295 0.037  0.198  0.024 
N   28,994  23,282  29,048  23,332 
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Figure 3.1 
“Simulated” Leverage Preference 
 
The figure reports the “simulated” cumulative distributions of the spreads in leverage preferences of 
institutional investors. The simulated distribution is obtained from 10,000 runs of the following 
simulation. In year t, each institution is assigned a simulated portfolio annually by randomly replacing 
each stock in its year-t portfolio with a different stock. Institutions are sorted annually into five leverage 
quintiles based on the dollar-weighted average leverage ratios of stocks in their simulated portfolios.  
Panel A displays the distribution of the difference in the average leverage of simulated portfolios in the 
top vs. bottom leverage quintiles.  Panel B (C) displays the distribution of the difference in the average 
leverage of simulated portfolios of stocks held at the end of year t+1 (initiated during year t+1) by 
institutions with simulated portfolios in the top vs. bottom leverage quintiles at year t.  As the holdings of 
institutional investors tend to show some persistence, the replacement stock is held constant in Panel B if 
the original stock is held by a particular institution at t and t+1. The observed spreads are those reported 
in the first column (“All Institutions”) of Table II. 
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